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ABSTRACT 
In the process of international socialization, states are induced to adopt the 
constitutive norms and rules of the international community. This thesis examines the 
process of norm transfer by International Organizations (IOs), specifically the EU and 
NATO. Generally, international norms are diffused through IO enlargement or, as an 
alternative, through the partnership between the organization and non-member states.  
The ultimate success of the socialization process depends on the strategies, 
mechanisms and tools that are used by each socializing agent. The effectiveness of IOs’ 
norms diffusion in dealing with partners is greater when the organizations apply 
differentiated, multi-staged socialization strategies that imply various levels of 
conditionality and offer powerful incentives that encourage domestic transformation.  
This study evaluates the effectiveness of the socialization strategies of the EU and 
NATO towards their East European neighbors given the fact that a prospective 
membership is not on the table. The main argument of this thesis is that, despite all 
positive achievements and results to date, the ENP as a norm diffusion mechanism is less 
effective than the PfP, and it could be improved by more actively applying the PfP’s 
experience. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The present study treats the manner in which norms of democratic governance 
have penetrated Central and Eastern Europe and what this process says to International 
Relations (IR) theory. Politics, society and the economy in the Euro-Atlantic world have 
become increasingly global. In its simplest sense globalization refers to “the widening, 
deepening and speeding up of global interconnectedness.”1 Since globalism is a 
multidimensional phenomenon, scholars distinguish four equally important forms of 
globalism: economic, military, environmental, and social and cultural globalism.2 
Cultural globalism implies, among others, the process whereby norms are diffused by 
various institutions and actors of various kinds.  
The contemporary world system is also characterized by being host to a plethora 
of international actors. The role of International Organizations (IO) as influential actors 
has increased. As a consequence, the IOs considerably affect the range of political 
options open to states’ domestic agents.  
The transfer of norms by the IOs to Eastern Europe, particularly of the EU and 
NATO, forms the center of gravity of this study. International norms are often diffused 
through the enlargement of International Organizations. But any enlargement process has 
its limits and depends on the willingness, readiness and the integration capacity of an 
organization. Therefore, partnership between the organization and non-member states is 
an alternative mechanism for the transfer of norms.  
The general goal of the thesis is to assess the effectiveness of the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Partnership for Peace Program  (PfP) as two 
substitute mechanisms of enlargement, through which the EU and NATO diffuse their 
norms to states that aspire to cooperation, affiliation or full membership. Particular 
                                                 
1 David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, “Rethinking Globalization,” in The Global Transformations 
Reader, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 67. 
2 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So 
What?),” in The Global Transformations Reader, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2003), 76. 
2 
attention in the present study will be paid to the ENP and PfP’s impact on two East 
European countries – Moldova and Ukraine.  
Although during the past two decades International Relations scholars have 
committed serious efforts to EU and NATO studies, certain areas in this field remain 
uncovered as events outrace the capacity of scholars to analyze them. This thesis is 
designed to fill such a gap in scholarship. First, the studies of the EU’s and NATO’s 
normative power refer mostly (with small exceptions) to the acceding and member 
countries, leaving aside the non-members, in particular the potential candidates in Eastern 
Europe. Second, there is still insufficient comparative research of the EU and NATO 
socialization strategies under conditions where the target states lack the most effective 
and attractive incentive – the membership perspectives. Finally, while the EU 
Neighborhood Policy is widely criticized by political analysts, there are still few 
academic studies that compare the EU partnership mechanisms and tools with those of 
NATO by applying the existing theoretical models of socialization.  
Thus, this thesis will contribute to assessing the impact of EU and NATO policies 
towards the East European neighbors who currently do not have the immediate 
perspective of full membership. It will evaluate the effectiveness of EU and NATO 
socialization strategies and the role of these organizations to motivate and foster domestic 
reforms in Moldova and Ukraine. In identifying the causes of success and failure of such 
strategies, this thesis will compare the instruments and tools that are employed by ENP 
and PfP.  
This topic is of crucial importance because the admission of Bulgaria and 
Romania to the EU in 2007 has marked out a “buffer” zone between the Euro-Atlantic 
liberal/pluralistic community and that of Russia. As a result, the struggle between ‘West’ 
and ‘East’ for “hearts and minds” in the East European countries will likely intensify. 
Therefore, the ultimate success of the socialization process depends on the strategies, 
mechanisms and tools that are used by each socializing agent. Since, at this stage, the EU 
and NATO do not offer to East European governments their main ‘carrot’ – the 
membership perspective – it can be argued that Russia is in a more advantageous position 
in maintaining its influence over the region due to several tools, among which the most 
3 
powerful are the energy supply, access to the Russian market and involvement in the 
settlement of the “frozen conflict” in the Trans-Dniester region (Moldova).   
The main research question of this thesis is: How effective are the EU’s and 
NATO’s socialization strategies towards the East European neighbors (Moldova and 
Ukraine) given the fact that a membership perspective is not offered?  
The analysis of the EU and NATO socialization strategies towards the non-
members must consider the specific status of those countries. For example, the EU 
applies a common framework for countries with yet distant but highly potential future 
membership perspective (Eastern Europe and to some degree South Caucasus) and those 
who would hardly ever become EU members (North Africa, Middle East). Such a lack of 
differentiation does not motivate compliance with EU norms and standards in the 
potential candidate countries.  
Thus, the first hypothesis of this thesis is that the effectiveness of IOs’ norms 
diffusion in dealing with partners is greater when the organizations apply differentiated, 
multi-staged socialization strategies that offer variable tools and imply various levels of 
conditionality. Thus, the target governments may choose the level of compliance with 
organizations’ rules depending on state interests and goals and domestic power costs. At 
the same time, the IOs’ socialization policy better reflects the progress achieved by the 
target states. 
Another distinctive aspect of the ENP is that the EU is predominantly using the 
rationalist approach to norm diffusion, applying strong political conditionality without 
offering its main reward – the membership perspectives. This fact weakens the credibility 
of the EU policy. Successful socialization depends on the quality of alternative 
incentives. Thus, the second hypothesis is that the incentives offered by the International 
Organizations to potential candidates may be less attractive than membership but need to 
be strong enough to encourage serious transformation in order to keep the potential future 
membership perspective open or, better, improve its prospects. In this respect NATO 
proves to be more successful. 
4 
The main argument of this thesis is that, despite all positive achievements and 
results to date, the ENP as a norm diffusion mechanism is less effective than the PfP. 
Although both mechanisms do not promise future membership, the ENP’s incentives and 
rewards are not powerful and credible enough to substantially trigger the target 
governments to adopt the EU rules, which is necessary in order to draw the East 
European countries closer to the acquis communautaire.  
It can be argued that the European neighborhood agenda and the EU rules are 
more complex and wider than those of NATO, which is mainly focused on reforming the 
defense and security sector. Nevertheless, this paper will argue that the EU, though 
initiating the ENP much later than NATO launched the Partnership for Peace, did not 
consider the almost ten-year instruments and tools that have already demonstrated their 
effectiveness.  
Therefore, this research suggests that the EU should introduce new elements in 
the ENP, analogous to those of NATO, which would offer a higher degree of interaction 
and integration between the EU and its Eastern neighbors. This would increase the 
effectiveness of the EU’s socialization strategy. It would still not grant the membership 
perspective, but already substantially reward an ENP country that is successfully 
transforming, thus facilitating compliance with the EU’s norms and rules and fostering 
the arduous transformation process.  
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I gives a brief introduction to the 
content of this thesis.  Chapter II provides the theoretical framework for further empirical 
analysis. It will focus on the concept of international norms, their emergence, 
internalization and diffusion by the agents of socialization. Then, the chapter will present 
the sociological approach to International Organizations as representatives of a 
community of states and their ability to transfer global norms through enlargement and 
partnership. In particular, EU and NATO will be considered. The rationalist and 
constructivist models of socialization diffusion will be presented.  
Chapter III will focus on the EU as a socializing agent. It will present the 
evolution of the ENP, its mechanisms and tools. The analytical part of the chapter will 
5 
assess the results of the application of the ENP on Moldova and Ukraine. The same 
structure will be used in Chapter IV in describing NATO’s socializing strategy. It will 
consider PfP as the key norm diffusion mechanism used in relation to non-member states. 
The chapter will also evaluate the effectiveness of the PfP’s tools and instruments.  
Based on the results of research, Chapter V will present a comparative analysis of 
the socialization strategies of both organizations by pointing to the causes of unsuccessful 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
7 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Traditionally the field of International Relations was divided among the 
protagonists of the rational theories – realism and institutionalism – and their mainstream 
approaches, neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Realists see the international system as 
anarchy in which self-interested and rational actors – sovereign states – are in an endless 
struggle to guard security or to maximize their power.3 On the other side of the spectrum 
scholars of the liberal tradition, though agreeing that the international system is anarchic, 
argued that states are eager to solve conflicts through cooperation. They share the realist 
assumption about the prevalence of rationalism in states’ decisions. However, 
institutionalists argue that cooperation is possible even in an anarchic self-help system 
where the fear of cheating and relative gains concerns impede cooperation. Neo-liberals 
have developed the “democratic peace” concept according to which democracies do not 
fight one another, thus partly overcoming the adverse effects of the security dilemma.4  
Although both paradigms have many divergences, they assumed that states have 
“innate and fixed interests and are constrained in their ability to further those interests 
because of material forces such as geography, technology and distribution of power.”5 
The lack of an ideational and normative approach to international politics, evident in the 
attempts to explain the end of the Cold War, gave birth in early 1990s to a new 
theoretical paradigm in the IR arena – social constructivism.  
                                                 
3 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1973);  Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill,1979); John J. 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); 
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics” 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. 
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Robert Powell, 
“Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate,” International 
Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994). 
4 Bruce Russet and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); 
Held and McGrew, eds., The Global Transformation Reader; J. L. Richardson, “Contending Liberalisms: 
Past and Present,” European Journal of International t6vg Relations 3, no. 1 (1997). 
5 Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: University Press, 2005), 252. 
8 
Constructivists suggest that the world system is an international community which 
is socially constructed. As noted by Adler, although constructivists are divided 
concerning some serious issues, they generally agree upon two important understandings: 
“the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality.”6 In contrast 
to both rational paradigms, which emphasize the role of material factors and rational 
choice, constructivists build their assumptions on sociological theory, asking for greater 
focus on “ideational forces such as ideas, knowledge, norms and rules in order to deepen 
our interpretation of world politics.”7 They attempt to open up these boxes, emphasizing 
that “state interests emerge from and are endogenous to interaction with structures,” 8 
when both sides are mutually constituted or, in other words, ‘socially constructed’.  
The viability of constructivists’ key concepts was widely recognized and today 
the main debate in the IR takes place between Rationalism and Constructivism. 
Constructivists have spent much energy explaining the importance of norms.9 They have 
analyzed how international norms affect domestic policies and explained the differences 
in norms’ impact. Thus, scholars seek to answer the question: How does the international 
community contribute to (re)shaping states’ domestic policies and structures and why do 
norms in some cases have a greater impact on state interests than in others? 
This thesis will take up this debate. It will specifically look through the prism of 
the rationalist-constructivist discussion at such problems as the norm diffusion by IOs. 
This chapter will focus particularly on the concept of norms, their role in IR theory and 
their impact on states’ domestic policies, as well as the role of IOs in the norm diffusion 
process. Before discussing the mechanisms of norm diffusion and the role of international 
                                                 
6 Emanuel Adler, “Constructivism and International Relations,” in Handbook of International 
Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2002), 95. Emphasis added by the author. 
7 Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” 252. 
8 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50, 
no. 2 (January 1998): 326. 
9Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 
World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 
“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 
1998).   
9 
organization in this process, it is necessary to look at the basics of normative theory – the 
emergence of international norms, their institutionalization within the IOs and the 
mechanisms through which the international actors socialize the target states. The next 
subchapter will describe some of the key concepts developed in the literature.   
A. INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN IR LITERATURE 
IR scholars differ in regards to the importance they attribute to norms in 
international relations. The debated topics include the origin of norms and causes of their 
change, as well as the impact that norms have on other actors’ behavior. Realists deny 
norms’ causal effect, while liberals consider the influence of norms in some issue-areas. 
Some supporters of ‘regime theory’ argue that norms, having a material base, “serve a 
regulative function, helping actors with given interests maximize utility.”10  
The constructivist approach goes further. It sees norms as standards of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity.11 Due to their ideational origin, norms may be 
compared with values, because both norms and values are interrelated with identity. 
However, whereas a value “refers to a desirable state of the world and defines the 
(ultimate) ends of action, a norm refers to the desirable behavior of actors and defines the 
appropriate means of action” which are used in order to achieve those ends.12  
IR scholars generally agree that norms may have constitutive, regulative, 
evaluative/prescriptive, or practical effects on states. ‘Constitutive’ norms define 
identities and create new actors and interests. They specify “what actions will cause 
relevant others to recognize and validate a particular identity.”13 ‘Regulative’ norms 
prescribe proper behavior for the actors with a defined identity. 14 The other two 
categories of norms, though conceptualized, are practically neglected by academic 
                                                 
10 Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn,” 327. 
11 Klotz, Norms in International Relations, 14; Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security, 5; 
Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 891-893.  
12 Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 71. Emphasis added by authors. 
13 Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security, 54. 
14 The protection of minority rights is an example of a regulative norm, while the state’s sovereignty is 
a constitutive international norm.  
10 
literature.15 When international norms are institutionalized within IOs or international 
regimes they are transformed into rules.16   
Once the importance of norms in international relations was confirmed, scholars 
noticed that the impact of norm differs. Thus, for example, it was observed that some 
norms have a more powerful resonance than others. Or, in similar circumstances, a 
particular set of norms promoted by the same socializing agents affected one country but 
not on other. For example, democratic norms promoted by the EU and NATO were 
successfully transferred to Central and Eastern Europe, but not in Belarus. These puzzles 
stimulated research on processes and mechanisms through which norms are diffused and 
the factors which are responsible for the success or failure of the norm diffusion process.  
A valuable contribution to the study of norm effects was offered by Finnemore 
and Sikkink, who developed the concept of a norm’s “life cycle”, according to which the 
norm influence occurs through a three stage process. It starts with “norm emergence”; 
continues with the norm acceptance process, termed as “norm cascade”; and ends with 
the norm “internalization”. The first two stages are separated by a “tipping point” at 
which the norm is adopted by a “critical mass of relevant state actors”.17 Figure 1 depicts 







   
   Stage 1 Tipping
point 
     Stage 2 Stage 3 
Figure 1.   Norm Life Cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink, 896) 
 
                                                 
15 See, for example, the comments in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security, 5, fn. 12. 
16 Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, International Socialization in Europe: 
European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 3. 
17 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 895. 
11 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the changes at each stage are characterized by 
different actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence.  These factors may have 
international or domestic origins: “multilateral institutional memberships, bilateral 
persuasion of learning, elite changes, domestic coalition building, and more dramatic 
domestic social transformation”.18 
Scholars have realized that for better understanding of norms’ impact, the norm 
diffusion process needs more attention. In general terms, the diffusion of norms may be 
described as a struggle for hearts and minds. Diffusion means a “transfer or transmission 
of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another” or 
a communication of an innovation “through certain channels over time among members 
of a social system.”19  
The academic literature distinguishes between “bottom-up” and “top-down” 
diffusion mechanisms. In the first case the main role is played by non-state actors and 
policy networks. The decision-makers are induced through mobilization and coercion to 
change state policy. While in the “bottom-up” mechanism norms are internalized through 
societal pressure on the elites, in the “top-down” process elite decision-makers are the 
main agents of norm diffusion. The role of political pressure is less and international 
norms are adopted mainly through social learning. 20  
For a new norm to emerge, two important elements are necessary: “norm 
entrepreneurs and organizational platforms from which the entrepreneurs act.”21 Norm 
entrepreneurs act as agents who build the new norm. They understand what kind of 
behavior is appropriate or desirable in their community and construct “cognitive frames” 
through which the new norm will be ‘interpreted’ to the society.22 According to Barnett, 
                                                 
18 Klotz, Norms in International Relations, 32. 
19 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” 
International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (March 1999): 85. 
20 Ibid., 88. 
21 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 896. 
22 Ibid., 897. For a deeper analysis of the role of “cognitive frames” see Rodger A. Payne, 
“Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction,” European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001).   
12 
frames help actors to “fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests 
and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems.” 23  
The necessity of suitable frames is explained by the fact that the new norm does 
not enter a “normative vacuum”, but instead must compete with the existing norms and 
interests. As Checkel argues, because of “country-specific differences”, a norm will be 
more rapidly diffused when “a cultural match exists between a systemic norm and a 
target country”.24 Checkel defines cultural match as “a situation where the prescriptions 
embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in 
discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies 
(organizational ethos and administrative procedures).”25 This definition implies that 
cultural match varies depending on issue-areas.  
In cases when international norms completely resonate in a particular issue-area 
with domestic ones, the cultural match is “positive” (+). If the domestic realm does not 
contain significant barriers for a particular norm the match is “null” (0). Once 
international norms collide with established domestic practices and rules the match is 
“negative” (-).26  In the latter case the constitutive or regulative effect of a norm is 
practically unattainable.    
The second important element of norm emergence refers to organizational 
platforms, because they serve as a starting point and as a transfer mechanism for 
international actors. Although sometimes norm entrepreneurs may build distinct 
organizational platforms (e.g., Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)) or may use 
“transnational advocacy networks”, usually the best way is to act through International 
Organizations whose agendas are much broader and include several international 
norms.27  
                                                 
23 Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European 
Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1 (1999): 25. 
24 Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity,” 87. 
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The joint efforts of norm entrepreneurs and IOs offer necessary support for state 
actors who promote the new norms domestically. Organizational platforms provide 
various instruments and tools for local entrepreneurs to proceed.28 The more effective the 
tools are which the organizations employ the more influence the norm will have. 
If the available tools are successfully applied, the new norm reaches the tipping 
point, when it is adopted by the “norm leaders” – a critical mass of persuaded actors 
within states.29 According to Finnemore and Sikkink, the critical mass of states is reached 
when the new norm is adopted by at least one third of the total state system. It is also 
important which states are among the supporters. As the authors highlight, those states 
“without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised” have a 
critical impact on the adoption of the new norm.30 Although at its first stage the new 
norm does not produce substantial change in the actor’s behavior, it creates the necessary 
premises for the future processes. Though the previous values and norms are still 
influential, they are more and more perceived as inappropriate by the growing number of 
people.  
Norm entrepreneurs and organizational frameworks are critical “building blocks” 
establishing the “groundwork” for norm diffusion. The instruments and tools used by 
them change the perception of population and reduce the cultural gap between domestic 
and international norms. But their role is not limited only to this stage. As this thesis will 
highlight, both elements are no less important at the next stages. If initially their main 
task is to challenge the established normative realm of a state and to acquire like-minded 
supporters, further stages will require more transformative actions. Thus, the application 
of new instruments and tools becomes crucial. 
1. International Socialization 
After the tipping point is reached, the norm enters its next stage – norm cascade – 
where the normative changes are more significant. International socialization is the 
dominant process at this stage. After the end of the Cold War rationalists and 
                                                 
28 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 900. 
29 Ibid., 901. 
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constructivists have much debated the place of ‘international socialization’ in IR theory. 
While rational-choice institutionalism largely neglects the importance of the socialization 
process as well as the socializing agencies, the constructivists emphasize the role of 
‘international and transnational organizations’ as main agents of socialization and 
develop relevant theoretical frameworks that explain the internalization of global 
norms.31  
International socialization is a process in which “states are induced to adopt the 
constitutive norms and rules of the international community.”32 A specific emphasis in 
this definition is put on the understanding of socialization not as an outcome, but as an 
open-ended process which is “directed at or potentially leading to rules adoption by the 
target state.”33  
Studying the effect of the socialization process, scholars sought explanations for 
the puzzle that similar processes under similar external conditions have different 
socializing effects. Cultural gaps and limited power of norm entrepreneurs and 
organizational frameworks may partly explain the failure of norm diffusion. However, 
more factors seem to come into play.  
In IR theory states are conceptualized as the main, but not the only, agents of 
socialization at the systemic level. Other agents are networks of norm entrepreneurs and 
International Organizations that pressure “targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws 
and to ratify treaties” and monitor the “compliance with international standards.”34 Thus, 
states may play the dual role of norm promoters and norm receptors. This thesis, 
however, is investigating socialization of states by International Organizations. Thus, it 
will focus on how IOs’ policies induce states to accept new norms and rules.  
                                                                                                                                                 
30 Finnemore,and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 901.  
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4 (Fall, 2005). 
32 Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, International Socialization, 2.  
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A model developed by Flockhart has contributed a lot to the studies of state 
socialization.35 According to this model the outcome of state socialization is determined 
mainly by a process of “self-other” categorization between all social groups. Identities 
were categorized in terms of the perception by a social group of a particular set of norms. 
Hierarchically, the range of identities varies from the ‘Other’ (defined as what the 
‘Self’/‘We’ is not and whose norm set is seen as unacceptable) to the ‘Significant We’ 
(what “‘Self’/‘We’ admires and strive to become” and whose rules are perceived as 
appropriate).36  
Flockhart has also divided the domestic structure into two social groups: 
state/elite and nation/people. She stresses that each group may differ in “self-other” 
categorization dynamics.37  Depending on the orientation of each social group towards 
the agent of socialization, the states may be divided into four typical out-groups as shown 
in Table 1. 
 







Values + norms 
No No 
Note: ‘Yes’ means that the socializer is seen as ‘Significant We’ and its set 
of norms is perceived as appropriate; ‘No’ means that the socializer is seen 
as ‘Other’ and its normative structure is inappropriate.  
 
As Flockhart suggested, “the introduction of the self- and other categorization 
processes as a key determinant and as the start of the socialization process” increase the 
explanatory significance of this model and help to account for “differences between 
                                                 
35 Trine Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialization’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization,” 
European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (2006). As author mentions, this model combines 
“social constructivist theories for the ideational change with the agent-level theories from social 
psychology, particularly Social Identity Theory (SIT) and associated self- and other categorization 
processes.” 
36 Ibid., 94. 
37 Ibid., 89. 
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seemingly similar cases.”38 Thus, the model allows evaluating the suitability of strategies 
and mechanisms of socialization in each particular case.  
The academic literature on socialization highlights two basic strategies of 
socialization or, if put differently, logics of action: the logic of consequence and the logic 
of appropriateness.39 In both cases the socialization process is driven by the agent of 
socialization, either an International Organization or an NGO. The first strategy follows 
the rationalist arguments and represents a result of bargains among self-interested and 
rationally calculating actors, stressing that the socializing agents use external rewards and 
sanctions to induce the target states to adopt the rules.40 Given the political demands 
addressed by the IOs to the target governments, this strategy is also called “political 
conditionality”.41 The success of this strategy is determined by the credibility of the 
incentives and the domestic power costs incurred by the target government which has to 
comply with the new norms. The domestic costs are influenced by the number of veto-
players.42  
The alternative strategy – the logic of appropriateness – is based on the 
constructivist arguments of socialization through “persuasion (rather than coercion) and 
“complex” learning (rather than behavioral adaptation)”.43 The transfer of norms occurs 
through a social learning process that changes attitudes without employing material 
instruments.44 Once the new rules are perceived as “natural, rightful, expected, and 
                                                 
38 Flockhart, “Complex Socialization,” 110.  
39 For a more detailed description of the logics of action see Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier, eds., Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); 
Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel International Socialization; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The 
Logic of Appropriateness,” ARENA Working Papers WP 04/09 (September 2004).  
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International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 948-952.  
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International Socialization, 7. 
42 George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002). 
43 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe: A 
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legitimate”, the target states are eager to comply.45 In sum, as argued by scholars, when 
the new international norms and rules are legitimate and resonate with the domestic 
realm, and when national elites identify themselves with the agent of socialization, the 
norm transfer through the logic of appropriateness is likely to be successful.46 
2. The Domestic Impact of International Norms 
IR scholars devoted significant attention to study the processes which occur in the 
domestic arena. Several authors argue that variations in the adoption of international 
norms at the national level are conditioned and may be explained by the level of domestic 
salience or legitimacy of a norm and by characteristics of the domestic context.47  
The domestic salience of a norm is based on the belief “that domestic institutions 
are better than other alternatives and therefore deserve obedience.”48 Before being 
adopted, a new norm is compared with the alternatives at the international and regional 
level. Thus, according to Finnemore and Sikkink, domestic legitimacy “is obviously 
important because it promotes compliance with government rules and laws.”49   
The domestic receptiveness of a new norm also depends on the quality of 
international norms. For example, Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel point out that, as 
a minimal condition, the norms diffused by International Organizations “must be based 
on the organizational rules rather than mere ad hoc interests of the member states”.50 Put 
differently, these norms must be “clearly defined, consensually shared, and consistently 
applied” among the IOs’ members.51 
When a norm becomes salient, “its invocation by relevant actors legitimates a 
particular behavior or action, creating a prima facie obligation, and thereby calling into 
                                                 
45 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness,” 2. 
46 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., Europeanization, 18-20. 
47 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International 
Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2, no.1 (Spring, 2000): 66.  
48 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 903. 
49 Ibid.  
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question or delegitimating alternative choices.”52 However, the mere consistence of state 
behavior with an international norm does not yet indicate that this particular norm is 
salient. In Checkel’s opinion, the domestic impact of an international norm may be 
observed through: (1) the appearance of the norm in domestic discourse; (2) changes 
(transformations) in the state’s domestic institutions; and (3) changes of the state’s 
policies. Since the changes and transformations in the institutions and policies are 
preceded by the changes in domestic discourse, the latter is the most important 
measure.53  
A salient norm is widely accepted domestically or, as some scholars suggest, is 
‘internalized’. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that an internalized norm achieves a “taken-
for-granted” quality.54 The conformance with such a norm is almost automatic. When a 
state “internalizes” a norm, it transforms the “rules of an international community into 
domestic rules that is, into domestic institutions and discourses that effectively govern 
domestic and foreign policy-making”.55 Under such conditions, the conformity with the 
norms within the domestic realm is no more questioned and it becomes extremely hard to 
disobey them.  
Scholars suggest that successful internalization of a norm may occur through 
professions, because rather than simply transfer the technical knowledge professional 
training “actively socializes people to value certain things above others.”56 For example, 
NATO’s assistance to reform the defense and security sector in partner countries 
significantly contributed to the promotion of democratic civil-military relations within 
their societies. 
This chapter has already emphasized several conditions, mechanisms and 
processes that have an impact on the norm diffusion processes. Respectively, these 
                                                 
52 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International 
Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2, no.1 (Spring 2000): 69. 
53 Ibid., 70-72. 
54 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 904. 
55 Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 73. 
56 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics,” 905. 
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factors allow the internalization of a global norm into the domestic arena. Academic 
literature in this field highlights two other important factors, namely political rhetoric and 
domestic interests. Thus, the political rhetoric generates the domestic collective 
understanding of an international norm. The declarations of political leaders illustrate the 
evolvement of a new norm’s acceptance or rejection. From the point of view of domestic 
interests, those norms that support “important domestic material interests, whether 
economic or security,” will be more easily internalized.57  
In sum, the domestic structures predict through which mechanisms the 
international norms are transmitted to the national arena, while domestic norms, by 
shaping the preferences of key agents, predetermine the degree to which they resonate 
and have constitutive effect in particular states.58 
3. International Organizations as Agents of Socialization 
The traditional state-centric approach of realism has led to the neglect or 
underestimation of the role of the EU and NATO as corporate actors. In response, 
institutionalists have rejected the state-centric approach and focused more attention on 
formal institutions and regimes. In particular sociological institutionalism, inspired by 
constructivism, often presents International Organizations as the main agents of 
socialization. The IOs are regarded as communities of states.59 They are guided by the 
common rules of the community and act on their behalf.  
Although different in their institutional set-up, both the EU and NATO are 
conceptualized as organizations embodying the transatlantic pluralistic security 
communities, defined by Adler and Barnett as a “transnational region comprised of 
sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.”60 
Some scholars propose to define the community more generally as a social group whose 
                                                 
57 Cortel and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms,” 76-79. 
58 Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity,” 91.  
59 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International 
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members share the same values and standards of behavior, that is, the same “culture” 
(though it may differ to some degree).61  
Ideally, depending on their “depth of trust” and the “nature and degree of 
institutionalization of their governance system,” security communities may be 
categorized as “loosely coupled” and “tightly coupled” communities.62  Both the EU and 
NATO are examples of a tightly coupled communities characterized by a highly 
institutionalized governance system (in the EU case to an even higher degree) and, 
despite some divergence, with such a profound trust among their members that one might 
speak of a common identity or ‘we-feeling’. Since both organizations are based on 
democratic values, the legitimacy of norms promoted by them is high.     
The transatlantic security community is based on liberal principles, pursues liberal 
values and acts according to liberal norms, such as social pluralism, the rule of law, 
democratic political participation and representation, private property and a market-based 
economy, peaceful conflict management, and multilateralism.63 These fundamental rules 
and norms have made the EU and NATO very attractive, especially in the post-Cold War 
period, for the newly established democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.  
The community’s institutionalization is expressed in community organizations 
that “regulate community membership and act to realize the community values and to 
uphold the community norms”.64 While rationalists see IOs as instruments “designed to 
help states to pursue their interests more efficiently”65, sociological institutionalists 
affirm that IOs are “autonomous and powerful actors” in their own right and may 
influence world politics “by establishing categories, fixing meanings, and diffusing 
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norms”.66 Thus, using their expertise and information, IOs regulate state behavior and 
shape state identities and interests.  
IOs do not only represent their communities, but they also build them. The most 
common way community-building occurs is through enlargement of an organization. 
Moreover, through the pre-accession process IOs socialize the soon-to-be members. A 
number of studies examined the enlargement process focusing on normative and 
ideational aspects.67  
Scholars see the IOs’ enlargement as one of the most efficient mechanisms of 
socialization. Once norms and rules are internalized within IOs, organizations tend to 
share their knowledge and to transmit to the target states the norms and models of good 
governance that are considered acceptable and legitimate.68 On the other side, the states 
in transition to democracy seek the membership in IOs because of their willingness to 
become part of the community. To join the ‘club’ states must conform to the 
organization’s criteria. Thus, membership in the IOs helps national elites to “credibly 
commit to reform efforts by establishing a mechanism that increases the cost of deviating 
from these efforts and backsliding.”69 
Recent studies have helped to broaden the analysis of the interaction between 
international and domestic politics. Some refer to the quality of the incentives provided 
by IOs for aspiring countries’ transformation and the impact of domestic costs; the role 
and the effectiveness of IOs’ conditionality during the socialization process; as well as 
the relationship between international pressure and national responses.70  
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However, the writings largely focus on acceding states or on those that have 
reliable perspectives of accession. The effectiveness of the EU and NATO’s norm 
diffusion process in relation to partners or neighbors lacking this clear perspective got 
less attention in academic literature. If focusing on these countries, scholars limit their 
analysis to one particular variable or one particular case.   
Generally the EU and NATO are widely presented as successful normative 
agents. Nevertheless, some authors point out their failure in promoting democracy71 and 
transparency.72 Arguing that the accession to NATO “did not contribute much to 
democratization in the three East European states admitted in 1999”, Dan Reiter proposes 
that in its approach to foster democratic transformation, the West “should rely on the 
European Union”.73 Alexandru Grigorescu argues that such organizations as NATO, the 
EU and the Council of Europe (CoE) “have been unsuccessful in transmitting 
transparency because this particular norm does not ‘resonate’ with the norms on which 
these IOs were founded”.74   
Although EU and NATO enlargement was covered by IR literature, until recently 
this domain suffered from a lack of comparative studies analyzing the relationship 
between the two processes. The bulk of previous writings was mainly descriptive or 
policy oriented and typically addressed single cases – “single enlargement rounds of 
single organizations, single member or accession countries, or even single policy areas in 
the enlargement process”.75 Such important topics as the pre-accession process and the 
impact of the IOs on the acceding countries were ignored. The literature on NATO 
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enlargement was focused predominantly on the impact of eastward enlargement in terms 
of promoting “greater peace and stability” in Europe.76  
In the last few years the situation has changed. Recent studies on enlargement 
redirected the emphasis on more crucial theoretical questions. The IR literature presents a 
series of empirically tested theories and models focused predominantly on the role of 
“external players and external governance in domestic political and economical 
transformations”. 77    
In 2002, while anticipating the “big-bang” enlargement, the EU initiated the 
formulation of a new policy towards future neighbors. Some analysts came up with 
specific recommendations for the development of the EU “Eastern Dimension” oriented 
towards Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine.78 Two years later this policy was formally 
conceptualized as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).79 The new policy 
instrument was analyzed rigorously. But the main contributions remained predominantly 
descriptive or policy oriented.80 Attempting to evaluate the EU’s policy impact on the 
transformation in neighboring countries, the authors came to the conclusion that as a 
norm diffusion mechanism the ENP has lots of lacunae. The lack of powerful and 
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attractive incentives, the “heterogeneity” of the ENP’s members and the vagueness of the 
EU’s rewards’ perspectives are perceived to be the main causes of these shortcomings.81  
The ENP may benefit from effective transatlantic cooperation. However, as 
mentioned by some commentators, although the EU and the US have many common or 
shared interests and their agendas are reinforcing each other, some factors may impede 
the transatlantic relationship. These are: different geographical, political, and economic 
“realities” in dealing with Eastern Europe; different policy agendas; and different 
approaches to democracy promotion, to mention just a few of them.82 
Another important issue is that the divergence among the EU members’ 
approaches towards the ENP affects the legitimacy and resonance of the EU policy in 
neighboring countries. Thus, for example, Germany’s “Russia first” policy and France’s 
main focus on Mediterranean countries compete with the calls expressed by the new EU 
members to direct more support towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.83 Such 
differences undermine the official EU rhetoric and decrease the likelihood of compliance 
of domestic actors in the ENP countries.   
NATO’s normative mechanisms are still understudied. Although the Partnership 
for Peace Program (PfP) proved to be an effective framework for domestic 
transformation in the defense and security sector of partner countries, academic literature 
is still lacking a comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of this effect. 
Moreover, the possibility of analytical comparison between the ENP and PfP is not 
explored yet. 
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The academic literature presents two strategies of community-building and 
international socialization in which enlargement functions in different ways: ‘inclusive’ 
and ‘exclusive’ strategies. In the first case, socialization occurs from ‘within’ the 
community. Thus, the aspiring country is first admitted to an organization and then is 
taught the rules of the organization. When a community is pursuing an inclusive strategy, 
“a state is admitted to an international organization if it aspires to become a member of 
the international community the organization represents”.84 Usually, the inclusive 
strategy is applied by those organizations which do not possess material incentives that 
can reinforce organizations’ conditionality. For example, the OSCE is the most inclusive 
organization. Due to the lack of powerful material incentives, the organization follows 
the logic of appropriateness and relies mainly on persuasion and social reinforcement.85   
When the IO is applying the ‘exclusive’ strategy, the community’s constitutive 
norms and values are communicated to the outsider. Once a state has internalized the 
constitutive values and norms of the international community it is admitted to the IO.86 
Although scholars stress that the EU and NATO rely predominantly on the exclusive 
strategy of socialization, some examples contradict this argument.87 Thus, sometimes IOs 
deviate from the “ideal types” and lower their thresholds to deal with complex realities.     
As argued in the academic literature, the exclusive strategy is based on the 
reinforcement by reward, punishment and support.88 The reinforcement by reward and 
punishment allows the IOs to promote a strong political conditionality. The more tangible 
are the incentives, and the higher the benefits, the more likely it is that the target states 
will comply.89 If a targeted state acknowledges that in case of non-compliance with the 
organization’s rules the rewards will be withheld, it is more likely that the decision-
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makers will reconsider the policies. At the same time, the IO’s promises must be credible. 
This refers to rewards as well as to punishment. Generally, the threat of expulsion from a 
program has a high degree of credibility. The states that fail to fulfill the political 
conditions set by the IO may be denied of any assistance or support (reinforcement by 
support).90 Although the reinforcement by rewards and punishment seems to be effective, 
recent empirical studies have demonstrated that this is not always the case.91  
As previously mentioned, enlargement is one of the most effective socialization 
mechanisms. However, any enlargement process has its limits and depends on the 
willingness, readiness and the integration capacity of the organization. Therefore, when 
an IO reaches the level of “enlargement fatigue”, it still may transfer its norms using 
alternative mechanisms, for example, through various partnerships with non-member 
states. But in this case, the partner states lack the critical incentive for their efforts – the 
perspective of membership in the organization. As a consequence, the IO’s policies have 
to muster all available “means”, strategies, instruments and tools, which might lead to 
desirable “ends”. The incentives which are offered to the target governments must be 
attractive enough to overcome the domestic power costs without affecting the IO’s 
structures and activity. This thesis will examine how this problem was solved by the EU 
and NATO. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1. Research Design 
This research will employ both the rationalist and the constructivist perspective, 
applying two alternative models of socialization to both the ENP and PfP.  
a. The Rationalist Perspective (External Incentives Model) 
This model follows the logic of consequence. The IO’s rules are set as 
conditions to the targeted countries. The rewards are promised in advance and may 
consist of assistance programs; closer ties and cooperation; deeper integration; and full 
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91 Ibid. The case of Belarus demonstrated that the reinforcement by punishment did not contribute to 
the changes in domestic policies. The case of Turkey shows that the reinforcement by rewards is also not 
always effective.  
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membership. Upon the fulfillment of the conditions set by the organization, the country 
may receive these rewards. According to the external incentives model a government 
adopts IO’s rules if the benefits of IO’s rewards are higher than the domestic adoption 
costs. The success of socialization depends on the size and speed of rewards. The more 
tangible and material the incentives are, and the higher the benefits are, the more likely it 
is that the target states will comply. At the same time, the IO’s promises must be credible. 
Generally, the threat of expulsion from a program has a high degree of credibility. 92 
“Domestic costs” is another factor that determines if a state will accept or 
reject the conditions. Domestic costs reflect “political or power costs of governments”.93 
The acceptance of liberal democratic norms automatically limits the power of 
governments. In addition, the domestic costs of compliance with norms are also affected 
by the role and the number of “veto-players”. Thus, the adoption of norms by national 
elites depends on four sets of factors: the determinacy of conditions; the size and speed of 
rewards; their credibility and conditionality; and the veto players and adoption costs.94  
In summary, according to the external incentives model the likelihood of a 
state’s compliance with the IO’s norms increases when the IO’s institutional demands are 
conditioned; when the conditionality is clear and plausible; when conditionality is 
credible (when domestic actors are convinced that promised IO’s threats and rewards will 
be delivered on); when domestic political and economic costs of adoption are low; and 
when the number of domestic veto players is low.95  
b. The Constructivist Perspective (Social Learning Model) 
This alternative model is driven by the logic of appropriateness, 
emphasizing the identification of a particular country with an IO. The whole process of 
norms and rules transfer is characterized by “persuasion (rather than coercion) and 
“complex” learning (rather than behavioral adaptation)”.96 According to the social 
                                                 
92 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization, 11-12. 
93 Schimmelfennig, “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe,” 4-6. 
94 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization, 10-17. 
95 Ibid., 16-17.  
96 Ibid., 9. 
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learning model “a government will comply with the norms of an organization if it is 
persuaded of their appropriateness”.97 There are three sets of factors through which an IO 
empowers national societal actors: the legitimacy of norms and process, identity and 
resonance. Thus, the social learning model highlights that the effectiveness of IO’s 
socialization strategy is affected by the legitimacy of the IO-supported institutions; the 
identification of national policy-makers and society with the liberal community; and the 
resonance of the IO’s norms within the target state.98 Table 2 summarizes all the 
influential factors and the hypotheses developed within each of these models. 
 
Table 2.   The Influential Factors of the Alternative Strategies of Socialization and 
Developed Hypotheses99  
Models Determinant factors Hypotheses 
The adoption of rules is more likely when 
Determinacy of conditions  The IO attaches clear conditionality to institutional 
demands 
Size and speed of rewards  The size and speed of rewards is adequate 
Credibility of conditionality  IO’s conditionality is credible 
External incentives 
model 
(Logic of consequence) 
 
 Veto players and adoption costs  Domestic and political costs of adoption as well as the 
number of domestic veto players are low   
Legitimacy of rules and process  The legitimacy of the rules increases 
Identity  National elites identify themselves with the IO 
Social learning model 
(Logic of 
appropriateness) Resonance  IO-supported rules encounter domestic resonance    
 
2. Methodology 
The empirical part of this thesis will present a comparative longitudinal and cross-
organizational policy case study. Since Moldova and Ukraine are not candidates for 
membership in one of the organizations, the full EU/NATO conditionality is not 
applicable. Nevertheless, one of the goals of this thesis is to evaluate the benefits of 
conditionality and strategic socialization at this still early stage of the countries’ 
                                                 
97 Schimmelfennig, “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe,” 7. 
98 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization, 18-20. 
99 The table summarizes the findings presented in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., The 
Europeanization, 10-20.   
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relationship with these IOs. This will allow one to draw conclusions on the conditions 
and mechanisms of norm diffusion in Eastern Europe.  
The analysis will focus on the instruments and ‘tools’ provided by ENP and PfP 
to stimulate domestic transformations. The comparative chapter will evaluate the 
effectiveness of both mechanisms with regard to Moldova and Ukraine. This case 
selection is motivated by several factors. First, both countries have the same formal 
relationship with both the EU and NATO through the ENP and, respectively, the PfP. 
The differences in the intensity of cooperation will help to determine the advantages and 
disadvantages of both mechanisms. Second, among all of the current ENP members these 
countries have the most likely perspectives to join the EU, simply because they are part 
of what is geographically considered the European continent.100 Third, since this region 
belonged to the former Soviet Union, it continues to be a terrain of struggle for influence 
between the West and Russia. Thus, attempts of the EU and NATO at norm diffusion 
collide with a strong impetus by Russia to diffuse its own quite different norms in the 
region.  
The impact of the EU’s and NATO’s socialization strategies will be measured 
from three perspectives: formal, behavioral and communicative or discursive. From a 
formal point of view, the compliance with the EU and NATO rules may be observed 
when a state (1) transposes these rules into national law and (2) establishes formal 
institutions and procedures in line with the EU and NATO demands. From a behavioral 
perspective, rule-conforming behavior attests to the adoption of rules. The discursive 
conception of norms indicates compliance with rules by observing changes in domestic 






                                                 
100 Belarus is also part of this group. However due to the Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime the 
country’s chances to join the EU are currently low.   
101 Schimelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization, 8. 
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Table 3.   The Forms of Compliance with EU/NATO Norms (adopted from Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization, 8) 
Formal conception Behavioral conception Communicative or discursive conception 
Transposition of the EU and NATO 
rules into national law 
The extent to which 
behavior is rule-
conforming 
Incorporation of a EU/NATO rule as a 
positive reference into discourse among 
domestic actors  
Establishment of formal institutions 




Finally, the data for each organization will be summarized in the following matrix 
(Table 4). 
 
Table 4.   Overview of the Case Study Conditions and Results 
Influential factors EU (ENP) NATO (PfP) 
Determinacy of conditions    
Size and speed of rewards    





Veto players and adoption costs   
Legitimacy of norms and 
process  
  





Resonance    
In conclusion, this thesis will lead to comparing the effectiveness of the 
EU/NATO norm diffusion mechanisms, emphasizing the shortcomings of the ENP 
compared with the PfP.  
The sources used for this thesis include basic EU and NATO documents; official 
documents from Moldova and Ukraine and their national and bilateral programs with 
both organizations; statistical data and opinion polls provided by the Eurobarometer, 
Freedom House, and other national and international analytical centers and think-tanks; 
as well as previous theoretical and empirical studies and policy papers. Finally, policy 
analyses and evaluations of these processes will be used for the research.   
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III. THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY 
As previously mentioned, enlargement is the most effective, though not the only 
mechanism of norm diffusion of IOs. However, the IOs’ readiness and integration 
capacity limits the enlargement process. Thus, IOs continue to socialize the non-member 
countries in addition through various partnership mechanisms. This chapter will focus on 
the effectiveness of the EU socialization policies and strategies towards those states to 
which the membership perspective has not been granted. The first subchapter will briefly 
describe the origins, motives and principles of the European Neighborhood Policy, while 
the second will evaluate the effectiveness of this policy from the rationalist and 
constructivist perspectives. The analysis will comprise the ENP in general as well as its 
particular impact on the East European neighbors – Moldova and Ukraine.  
A. THE ENP – ORIGINS, RATIONALE AND PRINCIPLES 
After the decision on the “Big-Bang” enlargement of 2004 had been made, the 
question of the relationship with new neighbors came up among the top priorities of the 
EU agenda. Strategically, the EU policy towards the neighbors was driven mainly by 
security concerns, followed by economic interests and democracy export. The EU 
Security Strategy (ESS) reflects the key issue of stability transfer to the EU 
neighborhood: “Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the 
European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close 
and cooperative relations.”102   
The ESS mentions that the main challenges faced by the EU and its neighbors 
come from poverty, insecurity, violent or ‘frozen’ conflicts, population explosions, 
resource shortages and failures of governance. Consequently, this leads to an increase of 
illegal immigration, the rise of organized crime, and the spread of conflicts fueled by 
extremist and ethnic movements. All together, these challenges have a negative impact on 
                                                 
102 “A Secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy,” (document proposed by Havier 
Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels on 12 
December 2003), http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf [accessed December 12, 2006]. 
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the security of the EU as much as on the entire European continent. Therefore, the 
promotion of stability, security and prosperity in the EU’s neighborhood – a zone where 
its influence is greatest – became a ‘flagship’ of the EU’s foreign policy. From the 
practical point of view, the goal for the ENP was to address weaknesses and 
shortcomings of the existing EU framework and documents.103 
The formulation of a new EU policy towards the neighbors was initiated in 2002. 
One year later, the EU intentions were officially formalized. The EU Communication on 
“Wider Europe” stresses that the EU should develop a zone of peace, stability and 
prosperity and a friendly neighborhood – a “ring of friends”104 – founded on common 
values and deeper integration.105 In 2004, this policy received its official name – the 
European Neighborhood Policy.106 Being targeted initially only on Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Moldova, the policy soon encompassed Russia and the countries of the Barcelona 
Process, with the final inclusion in 2004 of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Currently, 
the ENP includes most of the countries with which the EU shares land or maritime 
borders.107  
                                                 
103 Rutger Wissels, “The Development of the European Neighborhood Policy,” in “The New 
Neighborhood Policy of the European Union: Perspectives from the European Commission, France, 
Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova,” ed. Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnish, 
Foreign Policy in Dialogue 6, issue 19 (2006), 8. The EU has currently two types of agreements which 
were signed before the initiation of the ENP. Thus, with East European neighbors the EU is cooperating on 
the basis of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA), while with the Mediterranean Partners on 
the basis of Association Agreements (AA). Although these agreements comprise the basic elements of the 
EU’s policy such as political dialogue and economic cooperation, they differ not only in their titles, but also 
in their content and are not adapted to the circumstances and priorities set in the EU’s new agenda. For 
more information on PCAs and AAs see the official EU web-site at http://europa.eu/index_en.htm.      
104 Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability,” speech at the 6th 
ECSA-World Conference (Brussels, 5-6 December 2002), 4. 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/ sp02_619.htm [accessed December 14, 2006]. 
105 “Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours,” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
(COM(2003)104 final, 11.3.2003), http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf [accessed 
December 12, 2006]. 
106 “European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper,” Communication from the Commission 
(COM(2004)373 final, 12.5.2004), http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf 
[accessed December 12, 2006]. 
107 ENP countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
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Despite its inclusion in the ENP, Russia, as the largest EU neighbor, insisted on a 
bilateral relationship that would emphasize its ‘special’ status. Thus, in 2004 the EU and 
Russia signed the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership that intensified and organized 
cooperation in four common spaces: economic; freedom, internal security and justice; 
external security; and research, education and culture.108 Belarus, Libya and Syria, 
though potentially covered by the ENP, do not have contractual relations with the EU. 
Thus, they do not fulfill the preconditions for benefiting from this policy.   
The main objectives of the ENP are the promotion of reform, the rule of law, 
stable democracies, and prosperity, security and stability in the EU’s neighborhood. 
Through an intensified political dialogue and deeper economic relationship, based on 
shared values and common interests, the EU aims to share with its neighbors the 
enlargement’s benefits and foster domestic transformation in neighboring countries.  
The new EU policy was initiated within the Directorate General (DG) 
Enlargement. Later, the EU created a new DG External Relations and Neighborhood 
Policy and transferred there several professionals who previously were responsible for 
enlargement.109 Relying strongly on the enlargement experience and involving the 
‘enlargement’ staff, the EU has applied to the ENP the socialization strategies similar to 
those used in its relations with the acceding countries. However, and this is a significant 
difference, from the beginning there were no intentions of the EU to offer any 
membership perspective to these neighbors. As Romano Prodi, President of the European 
Commission, stated in 2002, the EU has “to be prepared to offer more than partnership 
and less than membership, without precluding the latter,” or put differently, to share with 
the neighbors “everything but institutions.”110 Thus, from its start the ENP was lacking 
the most attractive incentive, indeed the ‘pivotal’ factor of the IOs’ socializing strategies. 
Notwithstanding, the ENP contained several attractive ‘rewards’. The European Union 
                                                 
108 European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm 
[accessed December 6, 2006].  
109 Amicai Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighborhood Policy Achieve 
Compliance?” Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law (CDDRL), Working Paper No. 
68 (August 2006), 397. 
110 Prodi, “A Wider Europe”, 7.  
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expressed the intention to offer to its neighbors a kind of ‘privileged’ partnership: 
financial assistance; the perspective of trade and economic integration with the EU; as 
well as the facilitation of migration and movement for ENP countries’ citizens.111 
The relations between the EU and its neighbors are governed by contractual 
agreements. On their basis, and in order to address the particular needs of the individual 
partners, the European Commission drafts Individual Reports. The reports regularly 
assess the current state of relations as well as political, social and economic developments 
and identify the set of issues that have to be addressed. By doing so, the reports serve as a 
basis for specific Action Plans that are worked out in cooperation with the respective 
countries. Progress in meeting the objectives is monitored in association or partnership 
councils established by the existing agreements. These plans finally constitute the points 
of reference for concrete implementation and assistance.  
The ENP Action Plans set norms and standards that a neighbor should adopt, 
indicating the objectives and priorities for action.112 They contain specific political, 
economic and cultural provisions, drawing on all three pillars of the EU.113 In particular, 
the Action Plans cover such areas as: 
1. Political dialogue and reform; 
2. Economic and social reform; 
3. Trade, market and regulatory reform; 
4. Cooperation on issues relating to justice, freedom and security; 
5. Cooperation and reform in sectors such as transport, energy, information society, 
environment, science and research; 
6. “People-to-people” contacts such as civil society, education, public health, 
cultural cooperation.  
                                                 
111 “European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper,” 3. 
112 In 2004 the EU Commission drafted the first seven Action Plans (with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, 
Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine).      
113 The three EU pillars are: European Communities (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC), 
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Despite the common ENP framework and structure, the Action Plans are 
differentiating, individualized and adapted to the particular circumstances and needs of 
each partner. For example, one of the key objectives of the EU–Moldova Action Plan is 
the EU support in settling the Transnistrian conflict.114 The ownership of a Plan is 
‘jointly’ shared between the EU and the neighbor. The current state of relations between 
the EU and the ENP countries is presented below in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Current State of Relations Between EU and ENP Countries (Adapted from 
Marchetti, “The European Neighborhood Policy,” 9, http://europa.eu.int).  
Contractual basis Action Plan ENP 
Countries type Agreed In force 
Country 
Report agreed in force 
Algeria AA 12/2001 09/2005 - - - 
Armenia PCA 04/1996 07/1999 03/2005 10/2006 11/2006 
Azerbaijan PCA 04/1996 07/1999 03/2005 10/2006 11/2006 
Belarus PCA 03/1995 - - - - 
Egypt AA 06/2001 06/2004 03/2005 - - 
Georgia PCA 04/1996 07/1999 03/2005 10/2006 11/2006 
Israel AA 11/1995 06/2000 05/2004 12/2004 04/2005 
Jordan AA 11/1997 05/2002 05/2004 12/2004 06/2005 
Lebanon AA 06/2002 04/2006 03/2005 07/2006 01/2007 
Libya - - - - - - 
Moldova PCA 11/1994 07/1998 05/2004 12/2004 02/2005 
Morocco AA 02/1996 03/2000 05/2004 12/2004 07/2005 
Palestinian 
Authority 
AA* 02/1997* 07/1997* 05/2004 12/2004 05/2005 
Syria AA 10/2004 - - - - 
Tunisia AA 07/1995 03/1998 05/2004 12/2004 07/2005 
Ukraine PCA 06/1994 03/1998 05/2004 12/2004 02/2005 
                                                 
114 EU – Moldova Action Plan, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_com_proposal_enp_ap_2004_en.pdf [accessed 
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            Note: PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; AA – Association Agreement; * - Interim 
Agreement. 
As previously stated, financial and technical assistance and the perspective of 
trade and market integration with the EU are the key incentives that may be offered to 
neighbors. In the context of a wider reform of the European Commission’s financial 
assistance, beginning in 2007 the ENP is employing a single European Neighborhood 
Policy Instrument (ENPI) which has replaced all previous programs such as MEDA115, 
Tacis116 and other existing programs. The main feature of the new instrument is that it is 
more flexible than its predecessors and is focusing specifically on cross-border 
cooperation and related activities. The preferential trading relationship – another ‘carrot’ 
of the ENP – is aimed to stimulate trade in new areas and provide opportunities for 
increased investment and self-sustaining economic growth.117 From this perspective it 
may be argued that for the Eastern neighbors the access to the EU’s Internal Market is 
more important than receiving financial aid. Besides the stimulation of domestic 
production, the preferential trade will contribute to diversification of exports. This, for 
example, is a critical issue in case of Moldova, whose exports are oriented mainly 
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B. THE RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
The rationale behind the ENP is to establish an international framework aimed 
towards the generation of domestic reform. Since it mirrors to some degree the structure 
of the accession process, it features one of the milestones of the EU enlargement strategy 
– political and economic conditionality.118 Political conditionality helps the socializing 
agent – an IO or other international actor – to “bring about and stabilize political change” 
in the target state.119 The EU policy in the neighborhood follows the same strategy as for 
the enlargement – reinforcement by reward, support and punishment. Partner countries 
are rewarded depending on the level of compliance with the IO’s norms and rules. The 
rewards may be social (mainly international recognition) or material (financial assistance, 
integration with the IO’s structures or military protection). The “Big Bang” enlargement 
has demonstrated the effectiveness of the EU strategy based on political conditionality. 
The question then is: Would the same strategy be similarly efficient in the relationship 
with states that do not have a membership perspective? While the ENP has inherited a lot 
from enlargement, it differs in some very important features. In general, the effectiveness 
of conditionality depends on four factors: determinacy of conditions, size and speed of 
rewards, credibility of rewards and domestic costs.  
1. Determinacy of Conditions 
Academic literature suggests that in order to ensure compliance of the target 
government with international norms and organizational rules, the IO must set up its 
requirements as conditions. Determinacy is important because it clarifies and formalizes 
the rules. The clearer is a rule, the more ‘legalized’ and compulsory is its status and, as a 
consequence, the greater is its determinacy. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier point out 
that determinacy has a significant informational value and makes conditionality more 
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http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/ia_2006/com_2006_0649_en.pdf [accessed December 12, 
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credible. Thus, it informs the target government about the actions that need to be taken in 
order to get rewards and, at the same time, limits the ability of the socializee “to 
manipulate the rule” or, in general, to avoid its adoption. 120 If the rules are well 
determined, they provide a roadmap for reforms.121 For example, the “Copenhagen 
Criteria” constitute the guidelines for all reforming candidate countries.122  
Several analyses indicate the weakness of the ENP rules from the point of view of 
their legal status and circumstantialities. While the EU relationship with the CEE 
countries was founded on legal documents – the Europe Agreements – the Action Plans 
proposed within the ENP are just political documents that have no legal force. Moreover, 
the ENP framework does not have its own set of defined criteria similar to the acquis. 
Commentators have noticed that although initially the EU has referred to compliance 
with the acquis communautaire as the basis for its relations with the neighbors, this 
conditionality has been replaced by reference to the vaguer term “European standards.” 
Such an approach is motivated by the difference in starting points between most of the 
ENP countries and those of the CEE.123  
There is also an understanding among the EU policy-makers that, under 
conditions when the membership perspective is absent, the target governments are 
tempted to refuse to align with the acquis because it will be considered “unreasonably 
onerous, thus undermining cooperative engagement.”124 Several scholars noted that in 
general the determinacy of the ENP Action Plans varies extensively and, as the 
experience of the CEE countries’ accession demonstrates, the variations in the alignment 
                                                 
120 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, eds., The Europeanization, 12.  
121 Amichai Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighborhood Policy Achieve 
Compliance?”  Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law (Stanford), CDDRL Working 
Papers, 68 (August 2006), 414. 
122 At the June 1993 European Council (Denmark) the EU has established criteria for the membership 
known as “Copenhagen Criteria”. To become a member of the EU, any aspiring country must meet the 
following criteria: Political – stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy; the rule of law; human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities; Economic – existence of a functioning market economy and 
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; Acceptance of the 
Community acquis – ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union. 
123 Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 414 – 415.  
124 Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 415. 
39 
with the acquis have a significant impact on the leverage. Main critics of the Action Plans 
refer to the low specificity of most priorities and tasks, as well as sometimes unclear 
specification of the partner countries’ commitments. For example, in the EU-Ukraine 
Action Plan it is not explicitly clear who is to “undertake first assessment of the impact of 
EU enlargement on trade between the EU and Ukraine during 2005 and regularly 
thereafter as appropriate.”125 Or, the EU–Moldova Action Plan contains such confusing 
demands as to “[e]nsure there is a contact point dealing with implementation of the 
movement of goods, which could also be used to improve information flows between the 
EU and Moldova and to exchange information with operators.”126  
Another example of the ENP weakness is the EU reaction to the democratic 
transformation in Ukraine brought by the 2004 “Orange Revolution”. Despite the fact 
that Ukraine has fulfilled the main commitments according to its Action Plan and 
organized democratic elections, the ENP could not outline any further measures to help in 
“maintaining [the] democratic transition beyond the first step of free and fair 
elections.”127  This confirms that the determinacy of the ENP rules is affected by the lack 
of comprehensive and detailed guidelines for reforms.   
2. Size and Speed of Rewards 
According to the external incentives model, compliance will vary depending on 
the ‘size’ and speed of rewards.128 Acknowledging that the accession perspective is “the 
most powerful stimulus for reforms,” the EU officials considered that a “less ambitious 
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goal,” based on the “concept of proximity would have a positive effect.”129 However, the 
available studies by now indicate that the EU expectations were far too optimistic. 
It is necessary to highlight the ambiguity of the EU approach towards the future 
membership perspectives for the ENP countries. The official ENP documents do not 
reject categorically the possibility of accession (at least for the European states which 
would correspond to the EU criteria). Yet, in the ENP framework the prospect of 
membership is absent for most of the neighbors (especially the Mediterranean states). 
Moldova and Ukraine are provided with vague and distant accession perspectives, while 
the future of relations with the South Caucasus countries seems even more ambiguous.130 
At the same time, EU officials clearly stated that the ENP should be regarded as “distinct 
from enlargement” and should not be perceived as a preparation stage for eventual 
accession.131 In addition, it is obvious that the EU is not going to invite new candidates in 
the near future. Thus, despite the insistent demands from Moldova and Ukraine, the EU 
did not make the accession perspectives for these countries more credible. Moreover, 
since the debate over Turkey and the two negative referenda in France and the 
Netherlands, EU leaders have become more restrictive on EU enlargement, calling for a 
stricter conditionality towards the new-comers and linking the admission of new 
members even more closely with the success of the institutional reform agenda within the 
EU.132 Therefore, as observed by several analysts, the low probability of any significant 
future changes in this area will further reduce the socializing capability of the ENP.  
Since the membership perspective is de facto absent, the EU had to devise 
alternative incentives within the ENP. From the beginning the EU has emphasized the 
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possibility of establishing close economic and political ties through the development of 
new structures and “institutions co-owned by the partners.”133 However, these intentions 
have not materialized. Several ‘attractive’ incentives which were proposed in the Wider 
Europe Communication remain predominantly unrealized. Commentators notice that in 
practice the EU remains reluctant to open those sectors of its Internal Market which are 
of greatest interest for most of the ENP countries. In particular, this refers to the access 
for agricultural products and to the free movement of persons.   
Scholars point out two additional factors that have compromised the attractiveness 
of ENP. First, as already mentioned, the ENP framework is based on the previous 
contractual agreements with the neighboring countries: the PCAs and AAs. Under these 
legal arrangements, the European neighbors are in a disadvantageous position in 
comparison to the Mediterranean countries, because even the “most advanced” PCAs 
with the Ukraine and Moldova “do not establish preferential treatment in trade, lack a 
timetable for regulatory approximation and … omit any reference to the prospect of 
integration into EU structures.”134 The establishment of a new, more enhanced 
contractual basis – the “European Neighborhood Agreements” – is reflected in the 
Constitutional Treaty. However, the French (May 2005) and Dutch (June 2005) 
referendums blocked this initiative.  
The second factor refers to the ENP budget. The EU decided, starting with 2007, 
to almost double the financial and technical assistance to the ENP countries for the period 
2007 – 2013.135 However, disagreements among the leading Member States upon the EU 
budget may hamper the availability of additional funds for the ENP.  
At the same time, the distribution of the ENP funds reflects a certain prioritization 
of the Mediterranean region to the disadvantage of the East European neighbors. Thus, 
the Mediterranean partners will receive approximately 70 percent of the overall ENP 
budget for 2007 – 2013. As Iris Kempe notes, contrary to the ENP strategic framework, 
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Russia is also a part of the ENP budget without being a part of the monitoring processes, 
which evaluates the implementation of the EU demands.136 This reduces the share for 
countries like Ukraine or Moldova even further.       
Hence, as this subchapter has shown, the quality and quantity of rewards currently 
offered by the ENP make this program less effective in terms of increasing the target 
governments’ will to comply with the EU rules. The key problem is the vagueness and 
uncertainty of the incentives. As in the case of the ENP conditionality, even though 
several attractive incentives were proposed in ENP strategic documents, their potential is 
not realized in practice. Moreover, the continuation of an ENP budget distribution that is 
perceived to be ‘unfair’ from the point of view of the East European neighbors will 
further diminish the credibility of the EU’s policy and thus the impetus for reforms. This 
is all the more critical since these are exactly those countries which are culturally closest 
to the EU and have the best perspectives to join the community at some point. For the 
European neighbor states the practical effectiveness of the new policy instrument is 
doubtful.  
3. Credibility of Conditionality 
The effectiveness of the rationalist strategy is highly dependent on the credibility 
of the conditions set up by the socializing agent. The more credible the promises of the 
IO are, the more confidence domestic actors will have in their implementation and, 
respectively, the higher will be their motivation to comply with the IO’s rules. The 
credibility is important both for the rewards granted in case of the adoption of rules and 
for the sanctions applied towards those states which fail to comply.  
The credibility of conditionality may be increased through a greater 
differentiation in the relationship with targeted countries. Usually, the EU’s external 
relations are based on the regional approach. Nevertheless, the European Commission has 
approached the pre-accession negotiations with CEE countries on a case-by-case basis. 
The same technique was transposed to the ENP framework, where the Action Plans are 
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negotiated individually with each partner. The aim is to create a competitive environment 
among the ENP countries and exhort those which seek to establish closer ties with the 
EU.    
However, commentators point to several factors that weaken the credibility of 
ENP conditionality. First, as previously mentioned, many incentives promised in official 
documents (e.g., “stake in the Internal Market”) have not been specified. Due to the fact 
that numerous EU demands are barely linked to the rewards, the target governments are 
uncertain about what incentives will indeed be delivered in practice. Second, the 
credibility of conditionality is undermined by the mixed signals sent to the ENP countries 
in the official EU documents and rhetoric.137 Thus, on the one hand, the Wider Europe 
Communication stressed that “the benefits from the prospect of closer economic 
integration with the EU” may be offered only “in return for concrete progress 
demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and 
institutional reforms, including aligning legislation with the acquis.”138 On the other 
hand, the Strategy Paper stated that “[t]he EU does not seek to impose priorities or 
conditions on its partners” and “[t]here can be no question of asking partners to accept a 
pre-determined set of priorities.”139  
In practice, within the ENP strong conditionality competes with the “softer 
‘engagement’ strategy” characteristic for previous EU relations with many of its 
neighbors, especially the Mediterranean countries.140 If compared to conditionality, a 
mere engagement strategy appears to be more convenient to the ENP governments 
                                                 
137 Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 416. 
138 “Wider Europe – Neighborhood,” 10. 
139 European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper,” 8. 
140 Magen, “The Shadow of Enlargement,” 417. ‘Engagement’ is defined as a “foreign policy strategy 
of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. 
The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialize 
government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways.” This strategy is also known as the strategy 
of interdependence; see Karen E. Smith, “Engagement and Conditionality: Incompatible or Mutually 
Reinforcing?” in New Terms of Engagement, ed. Richard Youngs (London: The Foreign Policy Center, 
2005), 23.    
44 
because it fosters long-term democratic processes without challenging a state’s 
sovereignty much.141  
Because the ENP framework gathers under one ‘umbrella’ countries with widely 
diverging interests, the EU can not apply the same conditionality to all of them.  Some 
partners (Moldova, Ukraine) aspire for EU membership and are willing to comply with 
the entire package of EU rules. Others, for example the Mediterranean countries, are 
ready for close cooperation with the EU mainly in the security and economical sectors 
without undertaking significant political transformations. Therefore, the EU risks to 
dilute its conditionality between “the ENP’s competing goals of promoting short-term 
security and stability – stressing strong policing over fundamental rights and cooperating 
with existing regimes – while also pursuing democratization and respect for liberal rights, 
including the Maghreb and Mashreq.”142  
Besides, the ENP credibility is also affected by differences among the EU 
Member States’ approaches towards the ENP. For example, Germany, which is 
traditionally the driving force of Eastern policy, perceives the ENP through the prism of 
its objectives in Eastern Europe: good relationship with Russia143, advocacy of the CEE 
countries’ interests (especially Poland) and coordination of its initiatives with European 
and transatlantic partners. The focus of German policy is mainly on Ukraine and Belarus 
and less on Moldova. Nevertheless, the intention to maintain good relations with these 
countries and with Russia at the same time has led to a “wait-and-see” policy that lacks 
“far-reaching visions or solutions regarding the future prospect of EU Eastern  
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enlargement, the geographic limits of the EU, or alternative institutional prospects for 
democratic newcomers such as Ukraine – and potentially Belarus – within the European 
architecture.”144 
Germany’s eastern approach contradicts the French insistence to focus more on 
the Mediterranean. Paris is more interested in developing the Southern Dimension in 
order to counterbalance the EU’s shift towards the east. Moreover, France is very 
skeptical about further EU enlargement rounds and regards the ENP as an alternative to 
full membership. Thus, for example, France has put the issue of absorption capacity at 
the center of the enlargement debate and has opposed elaborating the “European 
perspective” for Moldova and Ukraine in the Action Plans.145 This, for example, was 
done with the Balkan countries in the Stabilization and Association Process which started 
in 2000, and proved to be efficient despite the alleged skepticism at the initial stage.146  
In contrast to both Germany and France, the new EU members (e.g., Poland and 
the Baltic States) call to direct more support towards Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus and 
harshly criticize the ENP for its ineffectiveness.147 Such differences undermine the 
official EU rhetoric and decrease the likelihood of compliance with EU norms. At the 
same time, given the particularities of the EU governance system, the Member States’ 
attitudes towards the neighbors is crucial.148 The experience of the last enlargement 
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round has demonstrated that competition between Member States’ interests (geo-
strategic, political and economic) has an overall negative impact on the EU conditionality 
even when strong incentives are offered.149 
4. Veto Players and Adoption Costs 
The last, but certainly not the least, important factor of the rationalist strategy of 
socialization refers to the adoption costs and the role of veto players. The use of 
conditionality itself assumes that when adopting the IO’s rules the domestic actors must 
assume costs, which generally are understood as political or power costs of the target 
government.150 Otherwise, if there would be no costs, the conditionality would be 
superfluous.  
Adoption costs depend on the government’s preferences and the number of veto 
players.151 Veto players are the “actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the 
status quo.”152 The higher the number of veto players is, the higher the power costs will 
be for the government. Several studies point out that high domestic costs during the early 
stages of the enlargement process of the CEE countries undermined the effectiveness of 
the socialization process until the EU stated clearly the membership perspective.153 
Therefore, the conditionality is effective and the likelihood of rule adoption increases, the 
more powerful the incentives are, the less the adoption costs and the fewer the veto 
players.154   
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In their studies on Europeanization scholars often rely on the Freedom Index (FI) 
data.155 According to these data, the starting point of the ENP countries is significantly 
different from that of the CEECs. With the exception of Israel, none of the ENP countries 
is ranked as ‘free’.  Most of the regimes are authoritarian or hybrid. This situation affects 
the EU conditionality in at least two respects. First, the lack of democracy and 
liberalization in most of the ENP countries creates a negative cultural mismatch between 
the EU and the ENP countries. Under such conditions the domestic costs of compliance 
with the EU rules are high and the adoption of the EU rules in these countries is very 
demanding. Second, as pointed out by some scholars, most authoritarian regimes perceive 
the liberal norms as challenging their power base.156 Thus, the incentives offered by the 
EU are perceived by the domestic elites as threats to their very existence. Therefore, the 
EU initiatives and offers are saluted mainly by the more liberal ENP countries (Israel, 
Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine). This argument also stresses the weaknesses of the EU 
policy towards the neighbors and reveals how much the different interests of the 
countries put in one ENP ‘basket’ impact upon the success of the conditionality principle. 
When referring to domestic costs, the role of third party players in Eastern Europe 
also needs to be mentioned. The EU agenda in this region is challenged by Russia, a 
direct EU neighbor and an influential actor in the post-Soviet space. The fact that 
Moldova and Ukraine are in the Russian “near abroad” makes the case of these countries 
very specific and substantially increases the adoption costs for both governments. It can 
be argued that Russia not only exerts an external influence on the EU prospect of both 
countries, but is able to employ several powerful tools to directly influence the domestic 
preference building process in both countries, thus increasing the number and relevance 
of veto players there.  
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Compared with the EU, Russia is in an even more ‘advantageous’ position in the 
struggle for Moldovan and Ukrainian “hearts and minds.” First of all, in maintaining its 
influence over the former Soviet states, Russia strongly supports those political parties, 
leaders and non-governmental organizations that are generally oriented towards deeper 
integration and closer ties with the “big eastern brother.” Second, pertaining to the status 
of an energetic superpower, Russia is using its economic ‘tools’ in support of the political 
ones. Although East European countries try to diversify their economic and security 
relations, their economies are still oriented mainly towards the Russian market and are 
highly dependent on Russia’s energy supply. Thus, though widely presented as ‘just’ an 
economic issue, Russia used the price of gas as a powerful political tool in recent winters 
against Ukraine and Moldova in order to ‘punish’ these countries for their pro-Western 
orientation. In addition, Russia has used its economic leverage by imposing restrictions 
on Moldovan agricultural products and wine imports, which to a significant degree 
finance the Moldovan state budget. Finally, Russia is the major player in the “frozen” 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Though a mediator in the Transnistrian conflict on 
Moldovan territory, Russia de facto provides full support to the separatists and 
contributes to the strengthening of their statehood, thus making the re-unification of 
Moldova even more difficult.157  
All these issues are very sensitive and have a significant impact on the domestic 
decision-making process in Moldova and Ukraine by raising the power costs for the local 
governments. The EU is interested in maintaining a balanced and stable long-term 
relationship with Russia because it is an important energy supplier and trade and 
investment partner for the Member States. At the same time, the EU must address 
security issues in its neighborhood. Thus, the EU took concrete measures to strengthen its 
engagement in the Transnistrian conflict. In 2005 the EU appointed a Special 
Representative (EUSR) to Moldova, opened an EU Delegation office in Chisinau, and 
launched the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) at the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
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border.158 Besides that, the EU, along with the US, participates as observers in the ‘5 +2’ 
negotiations.159 Nevertheless, the Union’s reluctance to offer to its new eastern neighbors 
a stake in the Internal Market further keeps these economies dependent on Russia. 
Therefore, in order to avoid internal crises, the Moldovan and Ukrainian decision makers 
may be reluctant to undertake risky transformations that would be neither supported by 
the population nor ‘welcomed’ by Moscow.  
C. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE  
The last chapter evaluated the ENP effectiveness from a rationalist perspective. 
Now this thesis will analyze the EU strategy of socialization from the constructivist point 
of view. In contrast to the rationalist strategy based on material factors, the constructivist 
approach to socialization emphasizes that compliance of target governments with IO 
rules is mainly driven by persuasion, engagement and complex learning. According to the 
social learning model the socialization process is affected by the legitimacy of the IO’s 
rules, the level of identification of domestic social groups with the IO, as well as by the 
resonance of the international norms and rules in the domestic arena, which is to a large 
degree determined by the level of cultural match.160 This subchapter will evaluate the 
impact of the ENP on all of these factors.  
1. Legitimacy 
Any rule adoption process is strongly affected by the legitimacy of the rules. 
However, legitimacy affects adoption particularly in the international system because of 
its central tenet of anarchy, i.e., the lack of a supreme legal authority able to enforce 
rules. As Franck suggests, the domestic laws differ from the international rules and norms 
in the way they secure compliance. Compliance with domestic laws can be enforced since 
they are located “within an infrastructure of government, constitution, courts, and 
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police.” Instead, in the international system rules “obligate … primarily because they are 
like the house rules of a club”161 – they are mainly politically binding, depending much 
more on their persuasive power.  
Legitimacy reflects “the quality of rules themselves and the process through 
which they were established and are transferred to the target states.”162 According to 
Franck, the determining factors of rules adoption are “the clarity with which the rules 
communicate, the integrity of the process by which the rules were made and are applied, 
their venerable pedigree and conceptual coherence. In short, it is the legitimacy of the 
rules which conduces to their being respected.”163  
Some commentators point out the weaknesses of the ENP rules’ legitimacy. Some 
scholars suggest that compliance with the IO’s rules is affected by such factors as the 
determinacy of the rules and the objectivity and fairness of the rule-adoption process.164  
Thus, the ENP Action Plans have several shortcomings in terms of legitimacy. As 
previously mentioned, most of the priorities are unspecified; sometimes is not clear who 
is responsible for the implementation of particular actions; it is not specified how 
progress will be judged; and some objectives that are to be met do not have a clearly 
specified time period.165 Another striking aspect is that although the Action Plans are 
‘jointly’ designed documents, the list of tasks that partners must accomplish is much 
longer than the list of the EU or ‘joint’ tasks. For example, Moldova is responsible for 
most of the 294 actions listed in the EU-Moldova Action Plan. Just 14 actions clearly 
refer to the EU, while the other 40 fall under the ‘joint’ responsibility.166  
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As already mentioned, the EU applies to the ENP countries the same 
conditionality as for the enlargement process. Yet, the lack of a membership perspective 
undermines the legitimacy of the EU demands. Although partners are required to 
undertake reforms in the decision-making process and in domestic institutions, the ENP 
has excluded them from the possible integration into the EU institutions at present, as 
well as in the foreseeable future. The ENP’s formula of “everything but institutions” 
confirms this approach. Thus, these deficiencies impact on the perception of fairness of 
the ENP rules, and the question “[w]hether ENP countries will accept as legitimate a 
system where they have neither present decision-making power, nor the prospect of equal 
participation in the future” remains open.167    
2. Identity 
The likelihood of compliance with the international norms increases when the 
elites and society of the target state identify themselves positively with the IO which 
promotes these rules.168 The “Complex Socialization” model presumes that the 
socialization process is more efficient when both social groups (elites/state and 
population/nation) see the socializing agent as a ‘Significant We’ (out-group 1).169 To a 
certain degree, Moldova and Ukraine (post-“Orange Revolution”) would probably qualify 
for this out-group. However, the ambiguities in Moldovan foreign policy and the 
parliamentary election in Ukraine in 2006 testified to a different orientation of a 
considerable part of the elites and societies in both countries. Nevertheless, a formal 
behavioral and discursive analysis of these countries demonstrates their basically pro-
European orientation.  
Thus, for example, the Foreign Policy Guidelines of Moldova in 1998 already 
confirmed the “European choice,” stating that EU membership is a key strategic 
objective. Since then this orientation was restated in several official documents, national 
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programs and institutional reforms.170 Besides the official rhetoric, the European 
integration strategy is also supported by the Moldovan population. Thus, the opinion poll 
in March-April 2006 shows that in a referendum 70% of respondents would vote for 
“integration into the EU.” In December 2005 and November 2004 this figure was 64.3% 
and 66%, respectively.171   
After the “Orange Revolution” Ukraine’s pro-European orientation was 
strengthened. Although EU integration was part of the Ukrainian foreign policy goals 
already under Kuchma’s presidency, it was not supported by corresponding reforms. The 
revolutionary events and the signing of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan in February 2005 
clearly demonstrated the willingness of the Ukrainian elites “to develop an internal 
dimension of the country’s European policy.”172 Despite the defeat of the pro-Western 
forces in the 2006 parliamentary elections, Ukraine has repeatedly confirmed its strategic 
orientation towards European integration and its commitment to continue the 
implementation of political and economic reforms according to the EU-Ukraine Action 
Plan.173   
Undoubtedly, the EU played a key role in forging a European identity in both 
countries and continues to do so through the ENP framework. Persuasion and social 
learning are the most suitable techniques for this task. Social learning is critical in the 
process of transforming individual and collective identities. It is facilitated by 
transactions which occur within organizational settings, involve communication between 
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human agents about “self-understanding, perception of reality, and … normative 
expectations,” and which promote “shared normative and epistemic understandings.”174  
Since it is an interactive social-cognitive process, social learning occurs through 
“interaction between domestic and international norm entrepreneurs and transnational 
frameworks.”175 How then do the ENP instruments contribute to this? 
A general critique addressed to the ENP mentions the heterogeneity of its 
members.176 This aspect refers to the cultural match and identity. The ENP countries 
differ in their goals and interests towards the European Union. Since the EU is applying a 
common framework for countries with yet distant but still real membership perspective 
(East European neighbors) and those which would hardly ever become EU members 
(North Africa, Middle East), even in the potential candidate countries the motivation for 
compliance with the EU norms and standards seems problematic.  
Despite this fact, the EU has a lot of opportunities through which it can contribute 
to the formation of a European identity. First of all, the ENP framework has intensified 
the official interaction between the EU and ENP countries. The mechanism of monitoring 
and action in different committees provides rich opportunities for an enhanced 
communication. Apart from that, the ENP offers other effective features for the 
promotion of social learning. 
A series of twinning programs are intended to provide the possibility of sharing 
the professional and technical experience of the member states with those of the ENP. 
They may also contribute to the development and strengthening of interpersonal links 
across the EU’s and member countries’ institutions. As the experience of the CEE and 
Balkan countries shows, the personal relationship between EU and local experts plays a 
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key role in the success of the twinning programs.177 Although the development of such 
programs is projected in the ENP framework, there are few examples of their realization.  
Social learning may also be facilitated through various societal interactions. Thus, 
the candidates for accession to the EU benefited from a series of community programs in 
several areas.178 These community programs were supplemented by a number of 
specialized agencies opened by the EU.179 Despite the participation of some of the ENP 
countries in community programs, the twinning program and agency components of the 
ENP are still predominantly in the planning stages.  
No less important for social learning are the people-to-people contacts, such as 
cultural exchanges, informal visits, vacation, etc. The ENP framework foresees 
facilitation of migration and movement for citizens from neighboring countries. 
However, until now the EU visa regime is still in force, despite the fact that some of the 
ENP countries (e.g., Moldova) have already lifted the entry visas for the EU citizens.     
3. Resonance 
The domestic impact of international norms is more powerful when these norms 
resonate with existing norms and rules in domestic politics. It was already mentioned that 
in terms of the cultural match the starting point of the ENP countries was far lower than 
that of the CEE countries. Under such conditions the EU has a more difficult task to 
accomplish in transforming the domestic fertility ground for the adoption of its rules. 
Persuasion is the most effective mechanism for this goal. 
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As a cognitive process and a powerful mechanism of social influence, persuasion 
“involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion.”180 
Academic literature examines the causal relationship between the design of 
organizational platforms and the impact of persuasion on domestic actors. Intensified 
professional contacts within thick institutional environments contributes to the creation of 
“epistemic communities” which help to promote international communication and 
socialization processes, as well as strengthen the interpersonal persuasion effects.181      
Similar to the instruments used by the EU in its negotiations with the CEE 
countries (the Accession Partnerships and Progress Reports ), the EU’s persuasive power 
is strengthened through the ENP Action Plans, the Country Reports and the subsequent 
monitoring process. All these elements “mark a degree of intensification of the process of 
cognitive engagement, reflection, and argumentation about the content of desired norms 
and rules.”182 Using this form of communicative action, the EU sets the agenda for 
debates, identifies the areas of necessary change, proposes policy solution, praises those 
who comply and “shames” the non-conformers.  
In the same context, the ENP framework contributes to the thickening of the 
institutional interaction established earlier by the PCAs and AAs. The creation of a 
network of sub-committees is intended to upgrade the scope and intensity of the dialogue 
and cooperation at the political and bureaucratic level. However, as noted by many 
commentators, until now the EU has established only a few sub-committees with Tunisia, 
Jordan and Morocco predominantly on Human Rights and Justice and Security, and the 
European Commission is negotiating with Israel the establishment of sub-committees that 
would address broader economical and political issues.183 At the same time, there are no 
sub-committees established between the EU and its Eastern neighbors. 
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Academic literature summarizes the key factors that may undermine the 
persuasive impact of the ENP on compliance. The effectiveness of the external 
persuasion is higher where the “threat from the counterattitudinal group is low, where the 
persuadee wishes to belong to the group of the persuader, and where the issue is highly 
technical or of little importance to the actor whose agreement is required.”184 In both 
cases – in Moldova and in Ukraine – the role of the counterattitudinal group is the most 
important one. As already mentioned, the pro-European aspirations in both states are 
challenged by the supporters of a deeper integration and closer relationship with Russia. 
Respectively, the task of the ENP is to contribute to the minimization of this group’s 
impact on domestic resonance.       
This chapter has evaluated the effectiveness of the European Neighborhood 
Policy from a rationalist and a constructivist perspective. The next chapter will focus on 
NATO and analyze the effectiveness of the Partnership for Peace program as the main 
socializing mechanism in dealing with NATO’s partners.   
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IV. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM 
The unprecedented political changes that occurred on the European continent in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s affected all the International Organizations responsible for 
European security. Among them, NATO was forced to undertake the most cardinal 
transformation for two main reasons. First of all, the new environment was characterized 
by the demise of the main enemy – the Socialist bloc. Therefore the first key task of the 
Alliance was to redefine its raison d’être and to adapt its security concept to the new 
circumstances. The very existence of NATO – which primarily was a collective defense 
organization – was at stake. Second, NATO was challenged by the CEE countries which 
regained their independence from the Soviet regime and directed their focus on the EU 
and NATO as the main guarantors of their national well-being and security and away 
from the internally unstable and still potentially threatening Russia. Thus, the Alliance 
had to find a way to deal with the newly emerging democracies without compromising its 
own capacity to act and without overstretching its security commitments.  
NATO found itself in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the Alliance did not 
have the will and was not ready before 1994 to respond positively to the accession 
demands of the CEE states. On the other hand, the Member States could not allow a 
potentially threatening security vacuum on the European continent. After long and fierce 
debates, NATO finally came out with a new strategic vision that, among others, foresaw 
the engagement of the Alliance in the democratization process in CEE states which were 
no longer seen as enemies.  
A. THE PFP – ORIGINS, RATIONALE, PRINCIPLES AND INSTRUMENTS    
The Alliance moved in the direction of partnership for the first time at the London 
summit in 1990, when NATO proposed a new cooperative relationship to all former 
members of the Warsaw Pact, in effect establishing diplomatic relations with all the 
former Warsaw Pact countries. Highlighting the achievements of the “most successful 
defensive alliance in history” in preserving European security, The London Declaration 
stated that the “Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which 
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were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them a hand of friendship.”185 In the 
meantime, by expressing NATO’s desire to intensify political and military contacts with 
the CEE countries, the London Declaration prepared the ground for the creation of the 
North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). 
NACC was created one year later, at the Rome Summit, and was the Alliance’s 
first attempt to go beyond “military contacts” and “regular diplomatic liaisons” with the 
states of the still existing Warsaw Pact and to develop “a more institutionalized 
relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues.”186 NACC 
membership was limited to NATO, former Warsaw Pact states and former Soviet Union 
republics. Its activities consisted mainly of regular and periodical meetings – workshops, 
seminars, conferences and colloquiums. NACC’s discussions focused mainly on such 
areas as peacekeeping, scientific and environmental cooperation, arms control 
verification, and conversion of defense industries. Nevertheless, partner nations wanted 
to go further, beyond merely discussing and listening to complaints. Since NACC lacked 
the necessary instruments, it could not take any action in such matters as, for example, 
the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the Baltic States or the dispute over 
Nagorno-Karabakh.187 When referring to the procedures and method of operation, 
Jonathan Eyal stresses that NACC was similar to the OSCE: “a gigantic talking shop 
where the formal opening speeches usually filled up most of the time available and the 
conclusions of the proceedings merely restated the questions originally posed for 
debate.”188 Therefore, since NACC failed to respond to partners’ needs and requirements, 
                                                 
185 “Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and 
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it became imperative for NATO as well as for the partners to move the relationship to a 
higher level of cooperation.  
At the Brussels Summit in 1994, within the framework developed by NACC, the 
Partnership for Peace Program was launched– a new initiative that has become “one of 
the most remarkable international achievements in the field of security” in the last 
decade.189 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is based on formal agreements. When joining 
the Program, partner states sign the PfP Framework Document and provide their 
Presentation Documents in which they state their commitments in terms of contribution 
to overall security, establish the areas of cooperation with NATO and present the assets 
that can be offered to the NATO/PfP multinational operations and exercises. The bi-
annual Individual Partnership Programs (IPP), signed between the Alliance and the 
partner nation, provides the foundation for their cooperation. It is the main working 
document of the PfP and reflects the goals and ambitions set out by partners in their 
Presentation Documents. Based on their objectives, partners choose individual activities 
included in the Partnership Working Plan (PWP), which later became the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Working Plan (EAPWP).190 Instantly, the new cooperative initiative of 
NATO was embraced by the majority of the CEE and FSU191 states.192      
The aim of the PfP was to establish a practical cooperation between NATO and 
non-members on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Another significant decision of this 
Summit was the reaffirmation of the NATO “Open door” policy. The PfP Invitation 
Document states that “the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington 
Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further 
the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
                                                 
189 “NATO Transformed,” 16, http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/nato-trans-eng.pdf [accessed 
December 10, 2006]. 
190 The EAPWP provide the overarching guidance for the cooperation and the list of supporting 
activities.  
191 FSU – Former Soviet Union.    
192 By the end of 1994, the PfP Framework Document was signed already by 23 countries (Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan).    
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area.”193 NATO welcomed its enlargement to the East “as part of an evolutionary 
process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of 
Europe.”194 Thus, the Allies provided final answers to long debated questions about the 
necessity of NATO enlargement.  
Under the permanent pressure from CEE aspiring countries, NATO initiated in 
1995 a special study that provided answers to the questions on ‘how’ and ‘why’ the 
Alliance should enlarge.195 The document argued that “enlargement will contribute to 
enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by: 
[e]ncouraging and supporting democratic reforms…; [f]ostering … the patterns and 
habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building…; [p]romoting good-
neighborly relations…; [e]mphasizing common defense and extending its benefits and 
increasing transparency in defense planning and military budgets…; [r]einforcing the 
tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe…; [s]trengthening the Alliance’s 
ability to contribute to European and international security…; [and s]trengthening and 
broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership.”196  
Originally it was debated in the US Administration whether PfP should replace 
enlargement, effectively limiting NATO’s outreach to the East to a mere partnership with 
accession perspective. But increasingly, PfP participation started to be seen as a 
preparatory step for NATO membership. The point is that through PfP, the Alliance 
sought to familiarize all partners (including possible future members) with the internal 
workings of NATO. This was supported by the “NATO Study on Enlargement,” which 
emphasized that the PfP’s task is to promote the knowledge transfer and learning through 
seminars, workshops and day-to-day interactions.197  
                                                 
193 “Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document, issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” (Brussels, 10 January 1994) 
www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110a.htm [accessed May 05, 2006].  
194 Ibid. 
195 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” (September 1995) www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm 
[accessed May 05, 2006]. 
196 “Study on NATO Enlargement,” Chapter 1.  
197 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Compliance and Conditionality,” ARENA Working Papers, WP 00/18 (2000), 
8.    
61 
Although at the beginning many aspirants saw PfP as a “policy of postponement,” 
the Program “did address some of their security concerns and established the norm that 
partners should make contributions to common security.”198 The Program offered to non-
NATO states a new level of cooperation with NATO “at a pace and scope” determined 
by their capacity and desire.199 The areas covered by PfP included defense reforms, 
military education and training, and civil emergency planning. Through PfP NATO 
sought to assist partners by developing joint planning, joint military exercises, and 
preparing partners’ forces for participation, along with NATO forces, in peacekeeping, 
search and rescue and humanitarian operations.200 In the meantime, within the PfP 
framework NATO took on itself certain security obligations to “consult with any active 
participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial 
integrity, political independence or security.”201 This fell short of a full-fledged security 
guarantee, but helped to reassure the partners. 
The main critics of the PfP pointed out that this was just a mechanism to postpone 
the decision on NATO enlargement. In general, having been created as an instrument for 
avoiding a discussion about NATO’s enlargement, PfP “was suddenly presented as a 
structure which ‘neither promises NATO membership, nor precludes this 
membership’…. Once PfP was in full swing, the same concept was presented as the road 
to NATO membership.”202   
PfP soon proved its advantages as a flexible initiative, capable to encompass 
different functions. It offered to partners the choice of ‘self-differentiation’ in their 
relationship with NATO. Thus, for some countries (i.e., SEE states) it became a starting 
point for their accession process; for others (i.e., Austria, Finland, Switzerland) it was a 
possibility to contribute more effectively to international security; and for some countries 
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it was an opportunity to learn from NATO allies.203 In line with the PfP and as 
recognition of the specific role that Russia and Ukraine play in the European security 
architecture, NATO established a special relationship with these countries: the NATO-
Russia Permanent Joint Council was founded in 1997 and in 2002 became the NATO-
Russia Council; the NATO-Ukraine Commission was created likewise in 1997, all of this 
linked to the first enlargement decision in Madrid in July of that year.204  
The PfP combined in itself both theoretical (seminars, conferences, workshops) 
and practical (education and training, exercises) activities which were geared to the 
promotion of transparency and interoperability, as well as regional military cooperation. 
Being continuously developed, enhanced and adapted to current challenges, the PfP 
offers to partners a wide range of instruments and tools for developing their defense and 
budget planning procedures; improving their national military education and training 
systems; and, enhancing their military capabilities in order to contribute to NATO-led 
operations. In contrast to NACC – mainly a political consultation forum – the PfP 
emphasized ‘operational’ issues. It introduced a structural and procedural depth 
previously absent in NATO’s cooperation activities.  
The PfP framework offered an effective foundation for the partners’ involvement 
in a NATO’s day-to-day business. Thus, it made possible for partners to open their 
permanent representation at NATO’s HQ in Brussels. In addition, in 1997 NATO 
established the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) – a unique PfP structure – designed 
to facilitate the coordination of joint military activities and military planning within the 
PfP. Once the PCC consisted of personnel from NATO countries and, since the beginning 
of 1998, also from partner countries, it offered a great opportunity for intensive 
interpersonal communication. Due to its location, it also allows the partners to work 
closer with the Alliance’s Supreme Command (SHAPE). At the same time, the 
establishment of the PCC significantly contributed to the improvement of the 
standardization level of the partners’ forces.  
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In 1997, being determined to “raise to a qualitatively new level their political and 
military cooperation,” NATO and PfP members decided to go further and inaugurated the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This was a new cooperative mechanism that 
replaced the NACC and provided a framework for a more expanded political dialog and 
practical cooperation under PfP.205  
The flexibility and receptivity of PfP allowed it to be very quickly adapted to 
NATO’s and partners’ needs as well as to the new security challenges. For example, 
when the 1999 enlargement round discovered a series of problems and difficulties of new 
members’ integration into the organization, NATO decided to focus more attention on the 
preparation of future aspirants. Using available mechanisms and tools within the 
framework of PfP, NATO developed a set of additional requirements for those partners 
who aspire to membership, allowing them to gradually enhance their structures and 
capabilities. As a consequence, those countries that joined NATO in 2004 were much 
better prepared and could easier integrate into NATO’s structures.  
 Membership Action Plan (MAP) went further than the “Study on NATO 
Enlargement” in defining the requirements for the aspirants on their path to membership. 
To some degree, the invitation to MAP is a strong indication for an aspiring country 
about its perspective to become a NATO member (though without being automatic).206  
 As NATO continued its enlargement and several partners joined the 
Alliance, the PfP agenda was re-oriented towards the needs of the remaining partner 
states. Thus, NATO proposed initiatives such as the Partnership Action Plan on 
Combating Terrorism (PAP-T) and Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institutions 
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Building (PAP-DIB).207 These ‘tools’ were specifically designed to enhance cooperation 
between NATO and the partners in combating global terrorism as well as to assist partner 
states in their efforts to reform national defense and security sectors.  
Accordingly, as a further step in strengthening the Partnership, NATO proposed a 
more comprehensive and advanced instrument – the Individual Partnership Action Plan 
(IPAP). It comprises all basic PfP initiatives and tools and establishes a bilateral, more 
individualized and intensified, cooperation between NATO and the partner country, even 
if that country does not intend to join NATO. The IPAPs cover such objectives as 
political and security issues; defense, security and military issues; public information; 
science and environment; civil emergency planning; and administrative, protective 
security and resource. The Action Plan is open to any partner (apart from those 
participating in MAP) who is politically willing and practically able to pursue its 
objectives.208 Similar to the ENP Action Plans, the IPAPs are ‘jointly’ owned by NATO 
and the partner states. The partners’ performance is monitored and evaluated each year at 
the “NATO + Partner” meetings at the level of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The 
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Table 6.   Current Status of the Partnership for Peace Members (Data retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int) 
Country PfP/EAPC IPAP MAP Intensified 
dialog 
Special relationship 
Albania 1994/1997 1999    
Armenia 1994/1997  2005   
Austria 1995/1997     
Azerbaijan 1994/1997  2004   
Belarus 1995/1997     
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
2006*     
Croatia 2000 2002    
Finland 1994/1997     
Georgia 1994/1997  2004 2006  
Ireland 1999     
Kazakhstan 1994/1997     
Kyrgyzstan 1994/1997     
Moldova 1994/1997  2006   
Montenegro 2006*     
Russia 1994/1997    NATO-Russia Council 
(2002) 
Serbia 2006*     
Sweden 1994/1997     
Switzerland 1996/1997     
Tajikistan 2002     
Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM)1  
1995/1997 1999    
Turkmenistan 1994/1997     
Ukraine 1994/1997   2005 NATO-Ukraine Commission 
(1997) 
Uzbekistan 1994/1997  2004   
Note: * - Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia joined the PfP on December 14, 2006. 
1 Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.  
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In conclusion, it should be mentioned that in parallel with PfP (whose focus was 
mainly on the CEE and FSU states), NATO has approached the problems of security and 
stability in other regions. Thus, in 1994 the Alliance launched the Mediterranean 
Dialogue (MD) and in 2004 the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).209 Despite the fact 
that the instability in these regions had direct impact on European security and on NATO, 
the Alliance decided to establish the cooperation with them outside the PfP framework, 
allowing only limited involvement in the Partnership.210    
B. RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE  
Academic literature suggests that NATO’s socialization strategy may be situated 
somewhere between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ conditionality.211 On the one hand, NATO 
follows the strategy based on material incentives and links the benefits of future 
membership to compliance with its demands, altering in this way the preferences of target 
states. On the other hand, especially in relations with those countries that seek closer 
cooperation with the Alliance but do not intend to join it, NATO explicitly relies on 
dialogue and consultations in building a domestic political consensus that would foster 
transformation and change. Rather than directly affecting the domestic actors’ 
preferences, this strategy aims at changing their “way of thinking.”212   
The character of NATO’s policy on PfP and the variety of available instruments 
make possible the use of a flexible socialization strategy. It may be argued that the level 
of conditionality applied to a partner country depends on the ambitions of that particular 
country. The Alliance’s demands become stronger and more determined as the level of 
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cooperation with the partner country moves from a merely general relationship (i.e., 
within NACC) to deeper cooperation within the PfP and (in particular, with partners who 
participate in PARP) to a more intensified and individualized partnership within IPAP up 
to the highest level of conditionality within the Intensified Dialog and MAP. The latter 
implies a “more cohesive and result-oriented partnership.”213 In the meantime, increasing 
the demands at each stage, NATO offers various tools that help partners bring their 
standards in line with those of the Alliance. By using the full range of opportunities of the 
PfP, partner countries achieve a level of transparency, knowledge and cooperation which 
is very close to that of NATO members.214 Thus, this thesis suggests that within PfP, 
NATO applies a kind of individualized, tailor-made conditionality.  
1. Determinacy of Conditions 
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that the Alliance has no “fixed 
or rigid list of criteria” for accession.215 The aspiring countries are not required to be 
fully interoperable with NATO before joining the Alliance, but need to meet “certain 
minimum standards essential to a functioning and credible Alliance.”216 Insofar as 
NATO deliberately did not follow the EU’s approach based on the Copenhagen Criteria 
of June 1993, according to which the subsequent accession process of each candidate is 
based on a chapter-by-chapter adoption of the acquis communautaire.  
Surely, the adherence to democratic norms is a necessary condition of NATO 
membership, but it is not sufficient. Since it is a security alliance, NATO puts specific 
emphasis on the development of adequate military capabilities and on the reform of the 
defense and security sector of the candidate country. To be considered eligible for NATO 
membership, the aspiring countries must be able to contribute to collective defense and to 
the Alliance's new missions, as well as to demonstrate the willingness to gradually 
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improve their military capabilities.217 According to NATO’s political demands, the new 
members have to establish, among other things, “appropriate democratic and civilian 
control of their armed forces.”218  
The determinacy of NATO conditions towards the partners increases as the 
country moves ‘closer’ to the Alliance. NATO’s demands for joining the NACC were 
vague. The former ‘enemies’ were “generically requested to reject an anti-Western 
identity.”219 When partners were invited to join PfP, NATO’s conditions became more 
determined. Already at this stage, partner countries are specifically asked to increase the 
“transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes, ensure democratic 
control of the armed forces,” as well as to develop and maintain “capability and 
readiness” in order to contribute to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under the 
UN and/or CSCE/OSCE mandate.220  
Nevertheless, within PfP, NATO does not ask partners for broader democratic 
transformation beyond the defense and security sector. Schimmelfennig, Engert and 
Knobel argue that in its relations with partners, the Alliance did not set up any specific 
‘democracy programmes.’221 Moreover, NATO has used the “reference to democracy 
more as a ‘rhetorical’ tool than an actual ‘condition’ for military cooperation.”222 In this 
respect, NATO’s Partnership policy is often criticized for its high ‘inclusiveness’.223 It is 
true to some degree that the lack of strong conditionality weakens the socialization effect 
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of the PfP. However, NATO has demonstrated a firm exclusiveness when it has refused 
for a long time to accept Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro into the PfP.224  
The key feature that determines NATO’s conditionality within PfP is the principle 
of self-differentiation. Whatever the partner’s choice and whatever its performance is, 
NATO is ready to offer a respective set of initiatives that imply various conditions and 
benefits. For example, once Ukraine and Georgia expressed their intention to join NATO, 
the Alliance came up with a new proposal to launch an Intensified Dialogue (ID) with 
these countries.225 Under this initiative, NATO and the partners agreed upon a set of 
more concrete actions geared towards further preparation of Ukraine and Georgia for 
accession.  
Accordingly, NATO’s flexible approach allows her to offer a different level of 
intensified cooperation and, respectively, to apply a stronger level of conditionality to 
countries which do not seek membership. The IPAPs signed between NATO and 
Moldova, Kazakhstan and Armenia demonstrate that. Under these tools, the partner 
countries agreed on new terms and conditions to foster the domestic reforms in the 
defense and security sector and to modernize their armed forces.226  
Another aspect of NATO’s conditionality is that PfP’s instruments provide 
partners with thorough guidelines for the modernization of their armed forces and the 
reform of their defense and security sectors. This is due to two factors. First, one of 
NATO’s demands towards partners is the contribution to NATO-led operations. Thus, the 
partners’ forces must be interoperable with those of the Alliance. NATO’s 
interoperability requirements are clearly specified in formal documents. To support 
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partners in attaining these standards, in December 1994 NATO launched the Planning 
and Review Process (PARP).227 PARP’s resemblance to NATO’s defense planning 
process allows the partners (including those who wish to join NATO) to move closer to 
the Alliance’s standards.228  
Second, the PAP-DIB provides a guideline for the development of democratically 
controlled armed forces. The important feature of this initiative is that it refers not only to 
military institutions but also includes the entire defense and security sector (i.e., 
government, parliament, etc.) as well as NGOs. Partner’s objectives in line with both 
instruments (PARP and PAP-DIB) are explicitly reflected in the IPAPs, thus making 
these Action Plans more specified and workable. In addition, the monitoring and 
evaluation procedures allow NATO to keep track of the partner’s performance and 
provide the necessary advice and support in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the 
tasks.   
In sum, as this subchapter revealed, despite the lack of formalized criteria for 
accession, NATO sets up within the PfP certain conditions which become more strong 
and determined as the partner country moves ‘closer’ to the Alliance. In the meantime, 
the determinacy of NATO conditionality is supported by the PfP instruments and tools, 
which offer clear guidelines for partners regarding what standards to achieve and what 
actions to undertake.    
2. Size and Speed of Rewards 
As in the case of the EU, NATO’s main reward is the membership perspective 
and, similarly to the ENP, the PfP does not offer such an incentive. Nevertheless, as was 
already mentioned, NATO is continuously confirming the openness of its ‘doors’ to any 
                                                 
227 Additional information on PARP is available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030208.htm [accessed January 15, 2007]. 
228 NATO has elaborated certain common requirements for the Member States forces which are 
formalized in the Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) or Allied Publications (APs). Within PARP 
each partner select a set of Partnership Goals which provide guidelines on how to prepare its military assets 
designated for the participation in multinational operations. Info about NATO’s standardization documents 
is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/standard.htm [accessed February 2, 2007].  
71 
partner that is willing and capable to meet NATO’s requirements. In this sense, PfP was 
always regarded by NATO as well as by the partners as a preparatory step for accession.  
NATO does not have such a broad range of incentives as the EU to offer to 
partners below the membership perspective. Its ‘carrots’ are limited. The main incentives 
that NATO offers to partners are the possibility to participate in the process of PfP 
planning and decision-making and partners’ gradual integration into the day-to-day 
Partnership business, including the peace support operations.229 Along with the PCC and 
National Representations at NATO HQ, the Alliance developed the concept of “PfP Staff 
Elements” (PSE), which are engaged in the development of different PfP initiatives, 
planning and execution of PfP activities. These structures are staffed with the military 
personnel from partner countries. The direct involvement of partners in the PfP planning 
and execution process makes the Program more adaptable and reactive to partners’ needs 
and, respectively, helps to shape the PfP activities in such a way as to ensure a maximum 
of effectiveness.  
The most ‘active’ partners benefit from another attractive incentive – enhanced 
political and military dialogue and consultation in formal and informal formats at various 
levels. These activities bring to the agenda the topics which are of NATO and partners’ 
concerns. Such an intensified cooperation gives NATO the opportunity to react swiftly to 
partner’s performances. For example, in contrast to the EU, NATO has been more 
sensible to the transformations brought in by the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine.230 
Thus, at the NATO-Ukraine summit in February 2005, the Alliance expressed its support 
for the ambitious reform plans of newly-elected President Victor Yushchenko. It also 
agreed to “sharpen and refocus” the NATO-Ukraine cooperation in accordance with the 
new government’s priorities. Although the Intensified Dialog does not guarantee the 
Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance, it is a very distinctive and attractive incentive.  
                                                 
229 The integration of partners’ military in the NATO structures is provided under the concept of 
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It should be mentioned that the implementation of NATO’s demands requires 
substantial resources and, sometimes, the difficult economic situation affects the partners’ 
capacity to cooperate within PfP. Although in contrast to the EU the Alliance’s capability 
to offer financial support is limited, NATO has elaborated the PfP Funding Policy. These 
resources are not distributed to a particular country but are used to cover the expenses for 
partners’ participation in specific activities (i.e., workshops, seminars, training courses, 
exercises) according to the partners’ IPPs. This instrument contributes to diminishing the 
negative impact of scarce resources in partner countries. 
3. Credibility of Conditions 
The PfP’s principle of self-differentiation and the Alliance’s promptness in 
offering the promised rewards increase partner’s motivation to comply with NATO’s 
demands. In addition, besides merely setting the requirements, the Alliance also actively 
assists partners in fulfilling them. As mentioned by Lucarelli, the Alliance first defines 
the boundaries within which partners should act; then it sets the objectives to be achieved 
(offering the partners the freedom of choice of action); and finally, it establishes the 
procedures of implementation of a particular objective. These procedures include 
frequent interaction between NATO and a partner, the exchange of opinion and NATO 
advice, as well as the process of evaluation and control. Therefore, along with the 
conditionality and the evaluation of partner’s compliance with the Alliance’s demands, 
NATO influences the country’s transition “by intervening with softer communicative 
instruments that include arguing and persuading rather that dictating.” 231  
As was argued, the PfP framework provides workable and efficient documents 
(i.e., IPAPs or Target Action Plan). For example, the key feature of the IPAPs is that the 
partners present measurable objectives in their foreign, defense and security policies, as 
well as set up realistic targets for political and defense reforms. The documents also 
reflect the steps that need to be taken by partners in support of these reforms and provide 
a timeframe for the implementation of each action. In the IPAPs, partners also indicate 
which actions may need NATO’s assistance. Accordingly, the documents formally 
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identify those NATO agencies and/or individual Member and partner states that are 
committed to provide such support.   
An important factor that positively impacts the credibility of NATO’s 
conditionality is the leading role of the United States in the Alliance. First of all, since the 
initiation of discussions about NATO enlargement, the US was the main “driving force” 
of this process and continues to be so at present. At different stages the American 
positions were either supported or opposed by the European Member States.232 The SEE 
countries that joined NATO in 1999 and 2004 saw the US as the main advocate of their 
interests and the guarantor of their security from a possible Russian threat. Presently, 
despite the fierce opposition of most of the “old” European Member States, the United 
States continues to support further enlargement of the Alliance and encourage those PfP 
countries that expressed their intentions to join NATO.233 Finally, besides political 
support, the US contributes to the partners’ performance financially. Thus, in July 1994 
President Bill Clinton launched the Warsaw Initiative (WI) aimed at helping “America's 
new democratic partners … to advance the Partnership for Peace's goals.”234  
The credibility of NATO demands is also supported by another NATO initiative – 
the PfP Trust Fund – which has already demonstrated its viability and effectiveness. The 
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aim of the Trust Fund is twofold: it offers assistance to partners in destroying their anti-
personnel land mine stockpiles and surpluses of munitions, unexploded ordnance, small 
arms and light weapons, as well as support partner nations in managing the consequences 
of defense reforms.235 In sum, all factors presented above increase the credibility of 
NATO’s demands. In the meantime, when partners start the painful and complicated 
transformation process they can be pretty confident in NATO’s assistance.  
4. Veto Players and Adoption Costs  
NATO’s tailor-made conditionality allows partner governments to adapt their 
country’s relationship with the Alliance to the adoption of power costs. For example, the 
same PfP opportunities are available for Sweden and Austria as for Moldova and Ukraine 
and, finally, for Belarus, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. However, the relationship between 
these countries and NATO is different. If cooperation with NATO does not correspond to 
the perceived national interests or is rejected by the majority of a population, the 
domestic decision makers may choose a relatively ‘passive’ partnership, limiting it to 
occasional formal high-level contacts and few training activities, without undertaking any 
far-reaching transformation in the defense and security institutions. Even if the PfP 
country is a non-liberal regime, it still has the possibility to choose a particular level of 
cooperation with NATO. As long as the partner is not excluded from PfP, the 
internalization of norms continues (even if very slow) and, consequently, diminishes the 
number of veto players. 
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It may be argued that in building the relationship with NATO, the governments of 
the FSU states face a common challenge: a strong external veto player – Russia. In 
general, Russia was always fiercely opposing NATO enlargement, especially when it 
comes to the question of the former Soviet Union republics’ membership.236 As a 
consequence, the “Russian factor” had a great impact on NATO’s decisions regarding the 
timing and composition of both enlargement rounds.237 In fact, as Fierke and Wiener 
argue, NATO created the PfP in order to avoid possible mobilization of nationalistic 
forces in Russia in case of an eventual decision to enlarge the Alliance.238  
For example, Russia is very suspicious about the pro-NATO orientation of 
Ukraine as well as the Moldovan desire for closer cooperation with NATO. Different 
Russian political factions support anti-NATO sentiments in Ukraine, thus undermining 
the credibility of the country’s aspirations to join the Alliance.239 At the same time, 
Russia strongly insists on Moldova’s confirmation of its neutrality and non-alignment 
with NATO as a pre-condition of the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.240 In both 
cases,  Russian actions raise the adoption costs for Moldovan and Ukrainian elites by 
‘feeding’ and increasing the number of domestic veto players.  
C. CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE 
Whereas rationalists regard PfP as the “equilibrium solution to the asymmetrical 
interests of NATO members and CEE countries,” for constructivists it is “an intermediary 
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and probationary stage in the socialization of potential new members.”241 Through the 
PfP, the Alliance not only “teaches values, norms, and practices of the Western 
international community,” but also monitors whether the aspiring countries meet the 
objectives.242 Several studies on socialization emphasize the effectiveness of NATO’s 
policies due to the primordial application of the logic of appropriateness. The following 
subchapters will focus on the impact of social factors on the effectiveness of the norm 
diffusion capability of PfP.   
1. Legitimacy 
Similar to the case of veto players and adoption costs, the principle of self-
determination within the PfP increases the legitimacy of NATO’s demands. It is the 
partner’s decision to choose to what extent he is ready and willing to comply with 
NATO’s demands. In this respect, two strong points of the PfP should be mentioned. 
NATO’s key conditions towards the partners refer to the reform of the defense and 
security sector as well as to the level of interoperability of the armed forces, or at least of 
those assets that are committed by partners to participate in NATO-led operations. The 
legitimacy of both demands is undisputable. The issue of national security is always on 
the list of priorities on government agendas and the transformation of the defense and 
security sector is an inseparable part of the entire process of democratization (in which 
most of the partners are involved), while the conformance with the standards of NATO 
forces is a vital precondition for successful participation in international operations.  
The legitimacy of NATO’s conditions is supported also by the adaptability of the 
PfP. During its entire period, the Partnership was developed and complemented with new 
initiatives, programs and tools that were necessary to increase the relationship and 
interaction with partners. Thus, after the accession of seven new members in 2004 was 
decided, NATO directed the Partnership toward the necessities of the remaining partners. 
The Alliance reviewed the objectives and priorities of the PfP by shifting its focus 
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geographically to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and conceptually to the defense 
and security sector reform.243 In support of partners’ efforts, NATO came up with the 
PAP-DIB – a valuable tool which “provides a common political and conceptual platform 
for bilateral and multilateral co-operation in developing and sustaining efficient and 
democratically responsible defence institutions including the armed forces under 
democratic and civilian control.”244 Finally, as previously stated, the PAP-DIB is a 
component part of the IPAP which, in turn, primarily reflects partners’ interests in line 
with NATO’s requirements. From this perspective, NATO’s conditionality appears to be 
highly legitimate.    
2. Identity 
A key factor that facilitated the compliance of the ‘young’ CEE democracies with 
NATO’s demands is the positive identification of their elites with the Alliance, perceived 
as a wide Euro-Atlantic “democratic security community” rather than a merely a 
“collective defense club.”245 The post-Cold War NATO became a very ‘attractive’ 
International Organization for many in CEE. As Lucarelli argues, the effectiveness of 
NATO’s “power of attraction” is due to the fact that “the boundaries of attractiveness 
were set implicitly by providing a tangible example of an international identity built 
within such boundaries and according to clearly defined norms and rules that provided 
shared meanings and understandings.”246 The arenas of persuasion set out by NATO 
contributed to convincing the partners that the proposed rules are valid. The Alliance was 
seen as a unique International Organization that may guarantee and provide protection 
and security not only to its members but also to its partners.  
Besides, NATO has significantly contributed to the formation of a Western 
identity not only in the acceding countries but also in partner states. Education is the main 
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process through which new identities are formed. In its essence, successful transfer of 
norms was possible due to the mutual recognition by both sides of their particular roles in 
the educational process: NATO in the role of ‘teacher’, and the partner states in the role 
of ‘students’.247 As a professional and competent teacher, NATO transfers its experience 
by organizing various educational activities.    
Through intensive transactions – “bounded communication”248 – and social 
learning within the PfP, NATO’s specific policies have contributed to the development of 
trustful relations and a collective identity. On the one side, the PfP framework has created 
various channels of communication through which domestic institutions and societies of 
the target states are socialized. In particular, the socializing effect of NATO policies 
occurs through different forums for discussion, formal and informal high-level meetings, 
multiple workshops, seminars, conferences, courses and exercises, as well as bilateral 
activities between NATO and partners.249  
On the other side, NATO created conditions for “deep social learning” of the 
elites and/or population that “has sometimes led to an actual reinterpretation of national 
beliefs and identity.”250 The communication between NATO and PfP elites and societies 
resulted in the formation of internal and external “epistemic communities.” The range of 
actors implicated in these communities includes politicians, military leaders, 
parliamentarians and civil society. The promotion of democratic institutional structures 
takes place through ‘strong’ and ‘soft’ conditionality, technical advice and actual 
teaching, as well as through providing models to emulate.251 In addition, the intense 
communicative frameworks help to develop a shared understanding of the liberal-
democratic form of the defense and security sector, as well as a strong institutional 
relationship between civilians and military. 
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The socializing role of communication and social learning is particularly 
important for developing a Euro-Atlantic identity in the former Soviet republics, where a 
strong ‘enemy’ image of NATO was portrayed over many decades. Even now, the 
Alliance is viewed by different social groups (in some cases by the entire societies) as an 
unfriendly military organization. Therefore, within the context of the internalization of 
the Western identity in the FSU countries, NATO is focusing its attention specifically on 
presenting itself as not only military, but also as an important political organization. 
Image-change is at the heart of these efforts. It is also important to notice that the 
spectrum of NATO’s educational activities targets various social groups rather than being 
focused only on elites. 
The identity factor in Moldova and Ukraine displays different features. It has to 
be stated from the outset, that in none of the countries the issue of integration in NATO is 
popular. According to opinion polls (March-April 2006), 34% of the Moldovan 
population would vote for the country’s membership in NATO, while 23.1% would be 
against. In the meantime, 22.9% of the respondents consider that joining NATO is the 
best solution to ensure Moldova’s security, 35.1% support neutrality and 14.6% support 
the adherence to the Joint Security Treaty of the CIS. Finally, the polls show that the 
majority of the Moldovan population has a positive attitude towards NATO. Thus, 29.6% 
perceive NATO as a “pan-European and transatlantic military-political alliance,” while 
22.3% of respondents view the Alliance as a “security ‘umbrella’ for countries of 
Western, Eastern and Central Europe.” The negative attitude towards NATO is 
characteristic for 7.5% who consider it as “an aggressive organization, a hotbed of 
instability” for Moldova.252  
In Ukraine the perspective of joining the Alliance is even less popular. According 
to opinion polls, almost two-thirds of the population oppose a membership in NATO, 
while only about 20% would say ‘yes’ to Ukrainian accession in a referendum.253 The 
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integration into the Alliance is mainly supported in the West of Ukraine (41%), while in 
other regions the majority of the population is against the membership perspective 
(Centre of Ukraine – 53%, South – 57.3%, and East – 70.7%).254  
Whereas in the Moldovan case the figures may be explained by the neutrality 
stipulated in the constitution of the country, which also corresponds to the government’s 
position, in Ukraine the polls show a serious split in the society in the attitudes towards 
NATO. In addition, after the 2006 Parliamentary elections, ambiguity towards NATO is 
the characteristic feature for the Ukrainian elites, including serious differences between 
the President on the one hand, and the Government and the Parliament on the other hand. 
Under such conditions, pressing for a referendum on accession to NATO would seriously 
undermine the Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic perspective.        
3. Resonance 
It is difficult to draw a dividing line between identity and resonance. Both factors 
are interrelated and equally affect the entire socialization process. Similar to the ENP, the 
PfP includes countries with different cultural match. As was already pointed out, NATO 
did not advance very tough conditions to states who wanted to join the PfP. As several 
scholars notice, the Partnership for Peace includes predominantly developed (Finland, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Austria) and emerging democracies (Ukraine, Moldova, the 
Balkans and South Caucasus countries). At the same time, NATO offers the same 
framework to semi-authoritarian or purely authoritarian regimes (such as in Central Asia 
or Belarus). Thus, it can be argued that in general the level of cultural match among the 
PfP members varies greatly.  
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What differentiates PfP from ENP is that in principle all PfP countries have the 
possibility to become a NATO member if they qualify, while some of the ENP countries 
(the Mediterranean states) cannot become an EU member, even if they comply with the 
whole set of EU rules.  
Many accounts of NATO’s socialization policy highlight the achievements of 
PfP’s persuasive power. There are several reasons for this. First, the specific focus of 
NATO’s efforts predominantly on the defense and security sector allows it to narrow the 
target area of interest and to direct more human and financial resources on a particular 
target group. This is much more difficult to do for the EU, because it engages 
simultaneously in a multitude of issue-areas and must thus focus on many more target 
groups.  
Several authors suggest that the socializing effects can be well observed in case of 
a military community – a powerful group of the society. Pevehouse, for example, 
mentions that “security-oriented organizations” may help to ‘democratize’ [the] military, 
which, similarly to business elites, is a very powerful actor.255 In addition to providing 
the “externally supported guarantees,” security-oriented IOs help to “reorient military 
officers away from interest in domestic politics.”256 By developing modern military 
forces, states are allocating resources which in turn ensure the institutional protection of 
militaries. All together, these actions contribute to a successful overall transition process.  
It also has to be mentioned that the socialization of the military has direct 
repercussions on domestic society in general. Through a wide range of instruments, 
NATO contributes to the socialization of military leaders in explaining their role in a 
democratic society. In addition, the military elites from the partner countries interact not 
only with their counterparts from the Member States, but also with the military elites 
from other partner countries. Thus, it may be argued that observation of the positive 
changes realized by some partners may have an important impact on beliefs and identity 
and may inspire emulation. To some degree, the democratic rules and conditions of IOs 
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in terms of domestic control of the Armed Forces may be accepted even by the military 
elites from the authoritarian states. Consequently, they become “more likely to accept full 
democracy.”257  
The new ideas and identities institutionalized within the militaries have a positive 
effect on their society which begins to perceive its Armed Forces not only as a defender 
of the country, but also as a contributor to international peace and security. For example, 
there is no doubt that participation of military contingents in NATO/PfP exercises or 
other multinational training activities positively echoes within the society. Therefore, the 
population would rather welcome and support, as a matter of pride, its national military 
forces that are capable to contribute to international efforts of maintaining security.  
It can be argued that the organization of such PfP events in a partner country may 
have a powerful socializing effect. Thus, for example, it is difficult to underestimate the 
socializing effect that the exercises hosted for the first time by Moldova in 2006 had on 
public opinion.258Ukraine has had a much more profound experience of hosting 
NATO/PfP exercises already since 1996. In the last decade Ukraine has hosted over 30 
multinational exercises.259 But along with this positive socialization, such efforts can also 
become counterproductive and may spur anti-NATO forces, as happened in 2006 in 
Ukraine.     
In sum, this subchapter pointed out that the intense process of communication 
between NATO and partners within the PfP framework contributes to a common 
interpretation of norms and rules, thus increasing the level of cultural match. Through the 
gradual development of shared identities, the establishment of “many-sided and direct 
relations among the states and their societies,” as well as through the establishment of 
democratic institutions, NATO creates conditions for the diffusion of liberal norms and 
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258 In September 2006 Moldova hosted a combined NATO/PfP exercise “Cooperative 
Longbow/Cooperative Lancer”.  
259 Data from the official site of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=cooperation&sub=participation [accessed January 17, 
2007].  
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values, though we have little proof of the effectiveness of these tools.260 The Alliance’s 
policies based on persuasion and social learning, rather than on ‘hard’ conditionality, and 
the wide spectrum of educational activities proposed within the PfP, seems to be more 
efficient in socializing the elites of the PfP countries. Therefore, NATO’s socialization 
strategies appear to be conducive in motivating domestic actors in partner states to 
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V. COMPARING THE SOCIALIZING STRATEGIES  
This chapter will summarize the analysis of the socialization strategies applied by 
the EU and NATO to partners that do not have membership perspectives. In particular, it 
will focus on the main achievements and shortcomings of the ENP and PfP, with specific 
emphasis on those elements which affect the compliance with norms in Eastern Europe. 
The data will be incorporated in a matrix. Finally, the chapter will present some 
recommendations and discuss about the way forward.     
A. THE RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE 
Despite the evident reliance of the EU on the rationalist strategy, the ENP appears 
to be less effective as a socialization mechanism if compared with NATO. A general 
distinguishing characteristic between the socialization strategies of the EU and of NATO 
is that the former has built its partnership policy on ‘hard’ conditionality, while the latter 
has applied a multi-level conditionality that is ‘tailor-made’ according to partner 
aspirations. This may be explained by the way in which each organization has 
approached the partnership issue. The ENP was structured along the EU’s enlargement 
‘model’. It inherited the strong ‘demand’ side of the process, while offering relatively 
weak rewards.  
NATO approached the enlargement process differently. Facing new challenges in 
the post-Cold War period, the Alliance initiated a gradual rapprochement with the former 
‘enemies’, transforming them step-by-step into ‘partners’, some of them later into 
members, and developing a new partnership framework that allows for a smooth 
transition from partnership to membership.  
Another general observation is that the EU has a formalized set of rules 
(“Copenhagen Criteria”) that the candidates have to comply with before they are accepted 
to the organization. In contrast, NATO does not have such fixed and rigid conditions for 
accession and, besides demanding general adherence to democratic norms and principles, 
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requests from future members’ specifically only a contribution to collective defense and 
to the Alliance’s missions. 
1. Determinacy of Conditions 
The research has pointed out that in terms of determinacy of conditions the PfP is 
more effective than the ENP in motivating the domestic actors of the target governments 
to comply with its demands. This may be explained by at least two reasons. First, the 
ENP covers a broader range of issue-areas. It is an advantage and a disadvantage at the 
same time. It is an advantage because the socialization process affects the target country 
in its entirety. It is a disadvantage because of the challenge faced by the target country 
that needs to tackle transformations in several areas simultaneously.  
Second, the EU can not demand from the ENP countries full compliance with the 
Copenhagen Criteria since it does not offer the membership perspective. Therefore, the 
reference to a vaguer term, “European standards,” leaves sometimes the domestic actors 
guessing what exactly should be undertaken. In addition, the thesis revealed that the ENP 
Action Plans are hardly seen as “real incentives for reform” because of too long lists of 
“priorities of actions” and things “to do.” The “benefits the ENP offers in response to 
compliance with EU rules are predominantly long-term and vague”261 and are not 
connected to fulfillment of the objectives or even the most important priorities. 
In this respect, NATO’s demands are more precise because they focus on a more 
limited range of issues (mostly on the defense and security sector and military 
capabilities of the partner countries). Besides, the tailor-made conditionality of the PfP 
and the variety of instruments and tools provided by the Program allows NATO to 
advance more concrete demands as the partner country intensifies its cooperation with the 
Alliance. The PfP framework also provides effective instruments that offer clear 
guidelines for reforms (Partnership Goals, STANAGs and APs). They are based on 
                                                 
261 Sergiu Panainte, “How to Deal with Future Neighbors? – The European Neighborhood Policy: The 
Case of Moldova,” in “Socializing Strategies and Their Application: The Case of Moldova,” Krystyna 
Kwarciak and Sergiu Panainte, Central European University, Working Paper 4/06 (2006): 30,  
http://www.ceu.hu/cens/assets/files/moldova [accessed December 12, 2006]. 
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commonly elaborated documents – NATO standards – and indicate not only the final 
goal to be achieved, but also the way how to accomplish it.  
2. Size and Speed of Rewards 
The research suggested that from the perspective of the size and speed of rewards, 
NATO’s Partnership policy is more conducive to compliance with the Alliance’s norms 
than the ENP, though the picture is more mixed here. The main reward that the EU and 
NATO can offer is the membership perspective. As this thesis pointed out, neither the 
ENP nor the PfP offer such a perspective. However, there are two explanations why 
NATO’s policy seems to be more promising than the EU’s. First, NATO permanently 
emphasizes its openness for new members, while the EU has reached an “enlargement 
fatigue” which signals both a reluctance to extend further invitations and, consequently, a 
pause in the enlargement process for an undetermined period of time. Second, NATO 
officially approaches the PfP as a preparatory stage for future members. The Partnership 
instruments and tools are directed towards gradual improvement of the structures and 
capabilities of those partners who wish to join the Alliance. In contrast, the EU does not 
attribute the same quality to the ENP, insisting on a clear distinction between the ENP 
and future membership.  
In terms of quantity of rewards, the ENP has potential advantages. Due to its wide 
scope, the EU can offer a broader range of incentives than NATO. In addition, the EU’s 
incentives are more attractive (financial aid, access to EU Internal Market, integration 
into the EU institutions, freedom of movement, etc.) and affect the entire society in 
partner countries. In the meantime, for the same reasons, delivering upon these incentives 
is much more complex and problematic. Their repercussions on EU structures and 
policies are much higher because they involve such critical areas as the EU’s economy 
(access on Internal Market), budget (financial aid), internal security (freedom of 
movement) and labor markets (migration of labor into the EU).  
It is true that the EU takes a more positive attitude when it comes to assist the 
candidate countries. The soon-to-be-members benefit from the entire spectrum of the 
EU’s potential and in this respect the EU’s socialization effect is higher than that of 
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NATO. In this context, the problem seems to be not the availability of ‘carrots’ but the 
EU Member States’ unwillingness to employ them with regard to the ENP countries.  
In contrast to the EU, NATO has succeeded in effectively realizing the limited set 
of incentives it can offer. Basically, the best that NATO can offer to partners is their 
integration in the NATO/PfP structures. This incentive has a huge positive effect on both 
sides of the process. For NATO, the direct link between the Alliance and the partners 
(through PCC) ensures effective cooperation and provides valuable input from partners 
while elaborating its initiatives within PfP. Concerning PSEs, NATO benefits by saving 
resources and, through intense communication, speeding up the process of socialization. 
On the other side, for partners this is a possibility to become part of the NATO/PfP 
‘kitchen’ and an opportunity to directly influence NATO’s PfP policy. In general, from 
the point of view of socialization, the intensive integration of the PfP elements in the 
NATO HQs is useful because it involves a level of implicit conditionality, since the 
candidates for the NATO/PfP positions must correspond to NATO standards.  
3. Credibility of Conditions   
This research has demonstrated that the EU conditionality is less credible, 
basically because the promised rewards are not always delivered in practice. In addition, 
the composition of the ENP itself also does not add too much to the credibility of the EU 
intentions. The same conditionality is applied to a group of highly heterogeneous 
countries with different interests and perspectives of membership. It is hardly conceivable 
that such a policy leads to substantial compliance among the potential candidates (Eastern 
Europe). Thus, the reluctance of the EU to somehow reflect the distinct status of the East 
European neighbors in ENP has a negative effect on the ENP’s credibility. NATO’s PfP 
is also characterized by a heterogeneous composition. However, it allows for 
differentiation and, thus, is reactive to the partners’ performances.    
This thesis has pointed out that an IO’s policy is more credible when it is backed 
by all its members. The example of the ENP shows that the EU Member States’ interests 
and approaches towards the neighbors diverge. It is especially important that the ‘old’ EU 
members (i.e., Germany and France) can not even agree which countries should be 
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accorded priority. The lack of a unified approach and, moreover, the diverging interests 
of the key players in the EU significantly undermine the overall credibility of the ENP. 
The situation is worsened by the specifics of EU governance in foreign policy which is 
still basically intergovernmental.  
In the same context, NATO’s enlargement and partnership policy appears more 
consequential due to the leading role of the United States, who, since 1993/94, is the 
main proponent of the organization’s enlargement. Since then, the US has been using its 
‘power’ to convince doubting members about the benefits of enlargement and is strongly 
supporting those partners that express their wish to join NATO. The American political 
support of partners, combined with the financial assistance, increases the credibility of 
the PfP.  
However, the existence of a hegemon within an IO also has a negative side. Shifts 
in US priorities, like after 9/11, may have immediate repercussions on the entire policy of 
an IO. Thus, as mentioned by Kamp, due to the current challenges faced by NATO, the 
US becomes more interested in those partners who can actively contribute to military 
operations and to the GWT.262 Therefore, its main assistance is directed to those PfP 
countries which express an interest to join the Alliance. In parallel, the US 
Administration develops alternatives to PfP, in particular the global partnership with so-
called “non-NATO nations.”263      
How can this affect the PfP countries? First, the US encourages ‘active’ 
participation, so those ‘moderate’ or ‘passive’ partners may remain beyond the US 
‘horizon’ and receive less American attention and support. Second, in general the shift of 
US interests and resources to alternative partnerships may diminish the credibility of the 
PfP as a whole. Thus, the ‘moderate’ partners (i.e., Moldova) might have to review their 
policy and to aspire for NATO membership.  
                                                 
262 Karl-Heinz Kamp,“‘Global Partnership’: A New Conflict Within NATO?” (Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung publication) no. 29 (May 2006) 
http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/veranstaltungsbeitraege/7_dokument_dok_pdf_9491_2.pdf 
[accessed January 15, 2007].  
263 GWT - Global War on Terrorism.  
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4. Veto Players and Adoption Costs  
The analysis has demonstrated that the impact of this factor on the level of 
compliance of the target governments depends on the type of strategy used by the IO. In 
relations with its neighbors the EU predominantly applies the exclusive strategy, while 
NATO’s PfP is more inclusive. On the one hand, the case of Belarus has demonstrated 
that due to the high adoption costs the application of the EU’s exclusive strategy is not 
necessarily effective and does not guarantee that the ‘punished’ country will change its 
policy. In the meantime, the exclusion from cooperation reduces the communication and 
contacts with the societal groups of this country. Thus, the socialization effect is 
practically missing where it might be needed most.  
On the other hand, PfP’s ‘inclusiveness’ of non-democratic regimes, though it 
contravenes basic principles and norms of the international community, still furthers the 
socialization process in that particular country. If the connections between a particular 
country and the IO are maintained, the socialization process (even if it goes slowly) still 
allows the norm entrepreneurs to build domestic organizational frameworks and 
internalize the new norms. Thus, the perspective of a government’s compliance with the 
IO’s norms is higher. What is remarkable for the PfP is that its framework offers to 
domestic players more room of ‘maneuver’ in defining the level of cooperation with the 
minimum adoption costs.  
Another argument of this thesis is that for the East European governments the 
domestic costs of compliance with the EU and NATO rules depend mostly on an external 
player – Russia. The recent conflict between Russia and Georgia has been a ‘showcase’ 
for the ‘near abroad’, demonstrating how far the Russian authorities may go and how 
strongly they may punish local governments who are trying to re-orient their foreign 
policies and ‘escape’ from Russian influence. Thus, in order to increase the effectiveness 
of their socialization processes the EU and NATO should be stricter in demanding from 
Russia the same level of compliance with democratic norms and rules as they do with 
regard to other partners. However, it should be emphasized that the academic literature 
focuses predominantly on domestic veto players and lacks studies on the impact of 
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external players on domestic adoption costs. The topic, especially the domestic level-
international level nexus of veto players, needs further research. 
B. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE 
This study has revealed serious problems in applying the constructivist 
perspective in measuring the effectiveness of a socialization policy. First of all, different 
factors legitimacy, identity and resonance are highly interrelated and would be difficult to 
analyze separately. Second, it is difficult to depict the cause-effect relation when these 
factors are considered. For example, there is no doubt that the identification of the target 
governments with the IO is crucial for the success of the socialization process. However, 
the socialization strategy itself affects the target country’s identity and, insofar, shapes 
the preferences of the decision-makers. Bidirectional causality is hardly measurable since 
you cannot hold one factor constant. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to determine 
which factor is decisive for the socialization outcome. Finally, for a more systematic 
analysis, the constructivist factors would need clearer definitions in order to delineate 
them more precisely.  
Nevertheless, based on the research findings, the ENP seems to be less effective 
applying the constructivist perspective. Despite the fact that the formal documents 
foresee various initiatives based on persuasion and social learning, most of them are still 
not realized in practice. Vice versa, persuasion and social learning are the key elements of 
the PfP success. A brief review of the main factors will confirm this.  
1. Legitimacy 
In general terms the legitimacy of rules and demands of both organizations is 
undisputable since the EU and NATO represent the international community and its 
democratic norms and values. Thus, the IOs’ demands to undertake democratic 
transformation are, basically, accepted in target countries, sometimes even more by the 
populations than by governments. However, difficulties arise when it comes to concrete 
mechanisms and particular demands. In this regard, as argued in this study, the ENP 
demands have a ‘mixed’ legitimacy among the domestic actors of targeted countries, for 
92 
reasons already mentioned in this chapter: unclear priorities and actions in the Action 
Plans; disputable balance of the obligations and commitments between the EU and 
partners; ‘unfairness’ of the rule-adoption process. But the main cause of the ENP’s 
weakness is the lacking balance between strong demands and weak rewards.  
In the meantime, NATO’s demands are fewer in number, but are perceived as 
more legitimate for at least two reasons. First, they focus on the defense and security 
sector, which is of critical importance for any independent state; and second, they help 
partners to practically realize their commitments in contributing to international peace 
and security. Besides, as previously stated, the flexibility of PfP’s framework allows a 
partner to restrict cooperation to a level where the Alliance’s demands are perceived as 
legitimate and right.   
2. Identity 
The identification of the domestic actors with the IOs facilitates the compliance 
with the IOs rules. This factor is interrelated with the previous one and, basically, 
determines the level of legitimacy of process and rules. This thesis has argued that both 
the ENP and PfP are heterogeneous in terms of the identity of their members. However, 
hypothetically all the PfP members may join NATO, while the EU is practically ‘closed’ 
for Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. In this regard, NATO’s policy is more 
differentiated by establishing separate partnerships with these regions, aiming at their 
gradual approach to the Alliance.  
Another observation of this research is that NATO’s Partnership policy, based on 
intensive communication, training and education, makes the PfP an effective socialization 
mechanism. Its instruments are equally directed towards both the elites and the 
population, while the ENP’s programs (as far as they are already implemented) are 
primarily geared towards decision-makers. The ‘epistemic communities’ created by 
NATO in the target countries act as powerful agents of socialization and at the same time 
contribute to the formation of efficient organizational platforms. Thus, socialization is 
possible even in countries with no accession aspirations. In this respect, the EU initiatives 
are sometimes absent or are not realized in practice. 
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Referring to the identity issue in Moldova and Ukraine, it should be mentioned 
that although pro-EU and pro-NATO sentiments are prevailing in both countries, there is 
still a split in societal preferences in terms of foreign policy orientations. However, in 
Moldova the pro-European orientation and intensified cooperation with NATO promoted 
by the government are basically supported by the population. In Ukraine the situation is 
more complicated, especially with regard to the country’s integration in NATO. The 
analysis has revealed a significant gap between the preferences of the elites (President 
versus government and parliament) as well as among the population (Western regions 
versus the rest of the country). This may be explained by the fact that NATO is still 
perceived by the majority of the Ukrainian population as a ‘hostile’ military Alliance and 
these sentiments are supported by the advocates of ‘Eastern’ (pro-Russian) orientation. 
Nevertheless, despite such big divergences the Ukrainian government continues to 
prepare the country for NATO membership and, significantly, the PfP framework is 
supportive in this sense.  
3. Resonance 
The last, but definitely not the least important factor of the socialization process 
can not be perceived in isolation of the previous two, and it affects the compliance with 
the IO’s norm in the same manner as identity and legitimacy do. As previously stated, 
one of the ENP weaknesses is the fact that in the same ‘basket’ are gathered countries 
which have little cultural match with the EU. The other problem is that the persuasive 
power of the ENP has not been used at its potential level despite the fact that the ENP 
framework practically affects the entire society in the target countries. Therefore, from 
this point of view, it can be also considered that the PfP proved to be the more efficient 
socializing mechanism.  









Table 7.   Overview of Case Study Conditions and Results (with focus on Eastern Europe)  
Influential factors EU (ENP) NATO (PfP) 
General 
Based on enlargement experience 
‘Hard’ conditionality  
Acquis Communautaire 
Preceded the enlargement policy 
 ‘Multi-level’ conditionality  
No fixed, rigid rules 
Determinacy of 
conditions 
Broad range of issue-areas 
Vague terms (“European standards”)  
Low specification of priorities, tasks 
and partners’ commitments, weak 
guidance for reforms (ENP Action 
Plan) 
Narrow focus on defense and 
security 
Official NATO standards 
(STANAGs)  
Specified objectives, timeline and 
partners’  and NATO’s 
commitments, clear guidance 
(“Partnership Goals”, PARP, IPAP) 
Size and speed of 
rewards 
 “Enlargement fatigue” 
No link between ENP and 
membership 
Numerous ‘attractive’ incentives  
No integration 
 “Open door policy”  
“Through PfP to membership” 
Limited number of incentives 




Rewards promised, but not realized  
‘One size fit all’ approach 
Divergences within the EU – no 
protagonist 
Promises delivered  
Conditions adapted to partners’ 
ambitions 
























Veto players and 
adoption costs 
Exclusive (Belarus, Libya) 
High adoption costs for 
authoritarian regimes 
Russian countervailing factor 
(moderate) 
Generally inclusive  
Low adoption costs for the non-
democratic regimes 
Russian countervailing factor 
(strong) 
General Weak reliance on social learning and persuasion 
Strong reliance on social learning 
and persuasion 
Legitimacy of 
norms and process 



























‘Heterogeneity’ of partners 
(negative) 
No special status for Ukraine 
Sketchy transactions  
Lack of training and education 
Lack of “epistemic communities” 
‘Heterogeneity’ of partners 
(positive) 
Special status for Ukraine  
Intensive transactions 
(communication) 
Emphasis on training and education 
Existent “epistemic communities” 
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Resonance 
Cultural match (0) – one ‘basket’ for 
all 
Broad range of targeted social 
groups 
Weak counterattitudinal groups  
Cultural match (+) – PfP, MD, ICI 
Narrow range of targeted social 
groups  
Strong counterattitudinal group 
 
In summary, to date the EU’s socialization strategy with regard to Eastern 
European countries is less effective than that of NATO. Nevertheless, realizing the 
shortcomings of the ENP and responding to the insistence of the Eastern neighbors, the 
EU is undertaking practical steps in order to increase the effectiveness of the ENP. Thus, 
at the end of 2006 a set of new initiatives was proposed. According to those initiatives, 
the EU focuses its attention on more practical steps to further enhance the economic and 
trade component; to facilitate the mobility and management of migration; to promote 
people-to-people exchanges; to build a thematic dimension to the ENP; and to strengthen 
political, regional and financial cooperation between the EU and ENP counties.264 
Moreover, the development of the ENP is among the priorities of the EU policy in 
2007,265 also reflected in the German EU Presidency’s program for the first semester.  
Some concrete steps have already been taken by the EU. Thus, the substantial 
increase of the financial assistance to Moldova,266 the initiation of the discussion between 
the EU and Ukraine on a more enhanced cooperation267 and the progress in negotiations 
                                                 
264 “On Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy,” Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament” (COM(2006)726 final), Brussels, December 4, 2006 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf [accessed December 4, 2006]. 
265 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy – Speaking Points,” 
Press conference at Brussels, December 4, 2006 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/778&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en [accessed December 12, 2006]. 
266 “European Commission Announces Substantial Increase in Financial Assistance to the Republic of 
Moldova,” Press release from Brussels, December 12, 2006 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1754&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLa
nguage=en [accessed December 12, 2006]. 
267 “EU-Ukraine Start Negotiations on New Enhanced Agreement,” Press release, March 2, 2007 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/275&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en [accessed March 13, 2007].  
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on the visa regime and preferential trade demonstrate the EU’s intentions to become a 
strong normative power by making the ENP a more efficient norm diffusion mechanism.    
Concluding the research, it should be pointed out that the validity of the claims 
made in this analysis may be arguable due to the specificity of comparison between the 
ENP and PfP. First, NATO’s Partnership policy was initiated in 1991. In more than ten 
years it has reached a degree of maturity which the still-emerging and much younger 
ENP has not attained as yet. Looking back at the evolution of PfP, it can be assumed that 
the ENP will also gain more socializing power. Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand 
why the EU did not rely on NATO’s rich experience in dealing with partners and did not 
adapt the successful PfP instruments to the Neighborhood Policy. It is further proof of a 
lacking culture of open dialogue and deliberation between NATO and the EU that NATO 
General Secretary de Hoop Scheffer recently himself alluded to.268 There is no transfer of 
experience from PfP to ENP, although both processes are mutually reinforcing, and the 
detrimental repercussions in terms of socialization are evident. 
Second, the PfP is specifically attractive for those countries that wish to join 
NATO and have an accession perspective. Thus, partnership and membership perspective 
reinforce one another. For the ENP, partnership and accession perspective are clearly 
separated. The negative consequences of separation of both processes in terms of 
motivation to reform are obvious and might lead the EU to rethink this basic tenet of its 
ENP. 
Finally, the arguments of this thesis apply mainly to the relationship of both 
organizations with the countries that have no membership perspectives. When referring to 
the enlargement, the EU possibilities in terms of rewards are much higher than those of 
NATO. Thus, its policy is more attractive and the socializing effect is more powerful.  
                                                 
268 “NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter,” Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap 
de Hoop Scheffer, Berlin (Germany), January 29, 2007 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html [accessed February 20, 2007].   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Global norms, values and rules spread by IOs affect decision-makers’ choices of 
domestic and foreign policies. However, the success of norm diffusion is not self-evident. 
It depends on the combination of several factors, such as the attractiveness and credibility 
of rewards and incentives offered by the IOs to target countries; the domestic costs of 
compliance with the IOs’ norms; the legitimacy of the IOs’ norms and rules; and the 
cultural match between the IOs and domestic societal actors in their reforms.  
This thesis has evaluated the process of norm diffusion by two International 
Organizations. It has demonstrated that for both cases enlargement is the main 
mechanism of norm diffusion in Eastern Europe. But, since the enlargement process 
depends on the IO’s readiness and integration capacity, the organization may also diffuse 
its norms through partnerships with states with a vague or non-existent membership 
perspective.  
In this context, the research has focused on the effectiveness of the socialization 
strategies applied by the EU and NATO towards the countries that presently do not have 
a membership perspective. This study’s main argument is that despite all positive 
achievements to date, the EU’s socialization mechanism – the ENP – seems to be less 
effective when compared to the PfP. Although both programs do not promise future 
membership, the PfP tools offer more flexibility, determinacy and attractiveness to 
partner countries’ governments. NATO’s policy is more motivational in terms of 
compliance with the Western community norms and better contributes to the promotion 
of the necessary reforms. The EU’s policy towards its neighbors suffers from a number of 
shortcomings, the main ones being: the low credibility and the vagueness of rewards and 
incentives; the heterogeneity of the ENP countries; the lack of clear guidance in the 
Action Plans; and the differences that still persist among the EU members over the 
neighborhood policy.  
Although the EU disposes of more options for an effective socialization process, 
it does not yet realize its potential in practice. Therefore, in order to achieve the real value 
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of ENP, the EU leadership should focus on practical realization of its intentions. At the 
same time, the ENP should differentiate more among countries with no membership 
perspective (Mediterranean, Central Asia) and countries with potential membership 
perspective (Eastern Europe), recognizing that today’s policy has a serious impact on 
domestic reforms and thus future perspectives. Socialization does not start with accession 
talks. The groundwork is laid much earlier – and ENP is the mechanism to do so.  
Finally, this research has discovered several shortcomings in the theoretical field. 
In particular, it has pointed out several ambiguities in measuring the effectiveness of the 
socialization policies from the constructivist perspective, which in itself has proved to be 
indeed relevant. Future studies should focus both on refining the theoretical concepts, 
specifically by coming up with less ambiguous and overlapping definitions of key 
categories like identity, reputation or legitimacy, and on devising more specific 
guidelines of how to measure the effectiveness of norm diffusion through 
operationalization of the constructivist factors. In that sense, this thesis might have 
contributed to highlighting some empirical as well as theoretical desiderata that need to 





LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. “Why States Act through Formal International 
Organizations.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (February 1998): 3-32. 
 
Adler, Emanuel. “Constructivism and International Relations.” In Handbook of 
International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. 
Simmons. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2002. 
 
Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett. “A Framework for the Study of Security 
Communities.” In Security Communities, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael 
Barnett. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Asmus, Ronald D. Opening NATO’s Door. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.   
 
Barnett, Michael. “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo.” 
European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1 (1999): 25. 
 
Barnett, Michael. “Social Constructivism.” In Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith. 
Oxford: University Press, 2005. 
 
Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. Rules of the World: International 
Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. 
 
“Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,”(Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 
1997). www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110a.htm [accessed May 05, 2006]. 
 
Baun, Michael. “The United States and European Neighborhood Policy.” Report 
prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research, 3rd Pan-European 
Conference on EU Politics, Bilgi University, Istanbul (September 21-23, 2006). 
 
Baylis, John, and Steve Smith, eds. Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations. Oxford: University Press, 2005. 
 
Biermann, Rafael. “The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – potential, problems and 
perspectives.” Center for European Integration Studies, Discussion Paper C 56 
(1999). http://www.zei.de/zei_english/publikation/publ_zeic_dp.htm [accessed 
December 17, 2007]. 
 
Bretherton, Charlotte, and John Vogler. The European Union as a Global Actor. New 
York: Routledge, 1999. Second edition, New York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
100 
Cameron, Fraser, ed. The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement. New York: 
Routledge, 2004. Reprint, New York: Routledge, 2005. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration.” ARENA 
Working Papers WP no. 6 (February 2006). 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.” World 
Politics 50, no .2 (January 1998): 324-348. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction 
and Framework.” International Organization 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 801-826. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-
Constructivist Divide.” European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 4 (1997): 
473-495.  
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe.” 
International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (March 1999): 83-114.  
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Sanctions, Social Learning and Institutions: Explaining State 
Compliance with the Norms of the Human Rights Regime.” ARENA Working Papers 
WP 99/11. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Social Constructivism in Global and European Politics (A Review 
Essay).” ARENA Working Papers WP 15/03. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change.” 
International Organization 55, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 553-588. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T., and Andrew Moravcsik. “A Constructivist Research Program in EU 
Studies?” European Union Politics 2, no. 2 (2001): 219-249.  
 
Cini, Michelle, ed. European Union Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 
Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis, Jr. “How Do International Institutions Matter? 
The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms.” International Studies 
Quarterly 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 451-478. 
 
Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis, Jr. “Understanding the Domestic Impact of 
International Norms: A Research Agenda.” International Studies Review 2, no. 1 




“Declaration on Peace and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions 
leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)) (“The 
Rome Declaration”).” www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108b.htm (accessed May 05, 
2006). 
 
“Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The London 
Declaration”).” www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b900706a.htm [accessed May 05, 2006]. 
 
“Enlargement Strategy and main Challenges 2006 – 2007”, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2006)649 final, 
8.11.2006). 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/ia_2006/com_2006_0649_en.pdf 
[accessed December 12, 2006]. 
 
“European Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper.” Communication from the Commission 
12. (COM(2004)373 final, 5.2004). 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf [accessed January 
15, 2007]. 
 
Eyal, Jonathan. “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision.” International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 73, no.4 (October 1997), 701.   
 
Farrell, Theo. “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program.” 
International Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2002): 49-72. 
 
Fierke, Karin M., and Antje Wiener. “Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO 
Enlargement.” Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 5 (December 1999): 721-
742. 
 
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change.” International Organization 52, no. 4, (Autumn 1998): 887-917.    
 
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 4 (June 2001): 391-416. 
 
Flockhart, Trine. “‘Complex Socialization’: A Framework for the Study of State 
Socialization.” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (2006): 89-118. 
 
Florini, Anna. “The Evolution of International Norms.” International Studies Quarterly 




Gheciu, Alexandra. “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 
‘New Europe’.” International Organization 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 973-1012. 
 
Goldblatt, David and Jonattan Perraton. “Rethinking Globalization.” In The Global 
Transformations Reader, edited by David Held and Anthony McGrew. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2003. 
 
Grigorescu, Alexandru. “European Institutions and Unsuccessful Norm Transmission: 
The case of Transparency.” International Politics 39 (December 2002): 467-489. 
 
Gromadzki, Grzegorz, Raimundas Lopata, and Kristi Raik. “Friends or Family?: Finnish, 
Lithuanian and Polish perspectives on the EU’s policy towards Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova.” FIIA Report, no.12 (2005). 
 
Guicherd, Catherine. “The Enlarged EU’s Eastern Border: Integrating Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova in the European Project.” SWP Studies, S 20, June 2002.  
 
Gurowitz, Amy. “The Diffusion of International Norms: Why Identity Matters.” 
International Politics 43, no. 3 (July 2006): 305-341. 
 
Gutu, Oxana. “Moldova’s Convergence with the Acquis: a Pro-Growth and Pro-
Integration Strategy.” Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Paper No.238 
(March 2006). 
 
Haftendon, Helga, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds. Imperfect Unions: 
Security Institutions over Time and Space. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Haukkala, Hiski, and Arkady Moshes. “Beyond “Big Bang”: The Challenges of the EU’s 
Neighborhood Policy in the East.” FIIA Report, No.9 (2004).  
 
Jacoby, Wade. The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the 
Menu in Central Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
 
Kamp, Karl-Heinz. “‘Global Partnership’: A New Conflict Within NATO?” Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung publication, no. 29 (May 2006). 
http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/veranstaltungsbeitraege/7_dokument_dok_pdf
_9491_2.pdf [accessed January 15, 2007].  
 
Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.  
 
Kempe, Iris. “From a European Neighborhood Policy toward a New Ostpolitik – The 
Potential Impact of German Policy.” Center for Applied Policy Research (C.A.P.). 
Policy Analysis, no. 3 (May 2006).    
 
103 
Kempe, Iris. “Identifying an Agenda for a new Eastern Policy – Connecting the German 
and Finnish EU Presidencies.” Center for Applied Policy Research (C.A.P.), Strategy 
paper no. 1 (2007), prepared for the Conference “Looking Towards the East. 
Connecting the German and Finnish EU Presidencies,” Berlin (December 17 – 19, 
2006). http://www.cap-lmu.de/publikationen/2007/cap-aktuell-2007-01.php [accessed 
February 20, 2007]. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.  
 
Keohane, Robert O. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989. 
 
Keohane, Robert O., ed. Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? 
(And So What?).” In The Global Transformations Reader, edited by David Held and 
Anthony McGrew. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. 
 
Klotz, Audie. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995.  
 
Kwarciak, Krystyna, and Sergiu Panainte. Socializaing Strategies and Their Application: 
The Case of Moldova. Central European University, Working Paper 04/06. 
 
Legro, Jeffrey W. “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism.” 
International Organization 51, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 31-63.  
 
Lieven, Anatol, and Dmitri Trenin, eds. Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the 
Price of Membership. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2003. 
 
Lucarelli, Sonia. “NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security 
Communities.” In Socializing Democratic Norms: The Role of International 
Organizations for the Construction of Europe, edited by Trine Flockhart. New York: 
Plagrave Macmillan, 2005. 
 
Magen, Amicai. “The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Neighborhood Policy 
Achieve Compliance?” Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law 
(CDDRL), Working Paper no. 68 (August 2006). 
 
Manners, Ian. “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered.” Paper prepared for CIDEL 
Workshop “From civilian to military power: the European Union at a crossroads?” 
Oslo (October 22-23, 2004). 
104 
Mansfield, Eduard D., and Jon C. Pevehouse. “Democratization and International 
Organizations.” International Organization 60, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 137-167. 
 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. “Elaborating the ‘New Institutionalism’.” ARENA 
Working Papers WP no. 11 (March 2005). 
 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. “The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 943-969. 
 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. “The Logic of Appropriateness.” ARENA Working 
Papers WP 04/09. September 2004.  
 
Mattli, Walter, and Thomas Plümper. “The Demand-side Politics of EU Enlargement: 
Democracy and the Application for EU Membership.” Journal of European Public 
Policy 9, no. 4 (August 2002): 550-574.  
 
Mearsheimer, John J. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International 
Security 19, no. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995): 5-49.  
 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2001. 
 
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. 
 
Overhaus, Marco, Hanns W. Maull, and Sebastian Harnish, eds. “The New 
Neighborhood Policy of the European Union: Perspectives from the European 
Commission, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova.” Foreign Policy in 
Dialogue 6, no. 19 (2006).  
 
Park, Susan. “Theorizing Norm Diffusion Within Internationla Organizations.” 
International Politics 43, no. 3 (July 2006): 342-361.  
 
“Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” (Brussels, 
January 10, 1994). http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm [accessed May 
26, 2006]. 
 
“Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document, issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” (Brussels, 
January 10, 1994). www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110a.htm [accessed May 05, 
2006].  
 
Pevehouse, Jon C. “Democracy form the Outside-In? International Organizations and 
Democratization.” International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 515-549. 
105 
Powell, Robert. “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal 
Debate.” International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 313-344. 
 
Prodi, Romano. “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability.” Speech 
at the 6th ECSA-World Conference (Brussels, 5-6 December 2002), 4. 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/ sp02_619.htm [accessed 
December 14, 2006]. 
 
Reiter, Dan. “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy.” International 
Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 41-67. 
 
Richardson, J. L. “Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present.” European Journal of 
International t6vg Relations 3, no. 1 (1997). 
 
Russet, Bruce, and John Oneal. Triangulating Peace. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2001. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and 
the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.” International Organization 55, no. 
1 (Winter 2001): 47-80.   
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement: Liberal Norms, 
Rhetorical Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East.” ARENA Working Papers 
WP 99/15. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and 
Rhetoric. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “European Neighborhood Policy: Political Conditionality and its 
Impact on Democracy in Non-Candidate Neighboring Countries.” Paper prepared for 
the EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference, Austin (March 31 – April 2, 
2005). 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern 
Europe: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper 
Series 5, no. 28 (August 2005). 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “Liberal Community and Enlargement: An Event History 
Analysis.” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (August 2002): 598-626.  
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation.” Security 
Studies 8, no. 2/3, Special Issue “The Origins of National Interests” (Winter 1998/99 
– Spring 1999): 198-234. 
 
106 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: 
Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central 
and Eastern Europe.” International Organization 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 827-860. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. The Europeanization of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds. “Governance by Conditionality: EU 
Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of 
European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (August 2004): 661-679. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research 
Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research.” Journal of European Public Policy 9, 
no. 4 (August 2002): 500-528. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel. International Socialization in 
Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.  
 
Sedelmeier, Ulrich. “Sectoral Dynamics of EU Enlargement: Advocacy, Access and 
Alliances in a Composite Policy.” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 
(August 2002): 627-649. 
 
Smith, Karen E. “The Outsiders: the European Neighborhood Policy.” International 
Affairs 81, no. 4 (2005): 764.  
 
Socor, Vladimir. “Confidential Russia-Moldova Bilateral Negotiations Fail,” (February 1, 
2007). 
http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=420&issue_id=3990&article_
id=2371859 [accessed February 20, 2007]. 
 
Socor, Vladimir. “Protests in Crimea, Incitement from Moscow, Paralysis in Kyiv Thwart 
Military Exercises,” (June 14, 2006). 
http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=414&issue_id=3763&article_
id=2371180 [accessed December 15, 2006]. 
 
“Study on NATO Enlargement.” September 1995. www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-
9501.htm [accessed May 05, 2006]. 
 
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002. 
 
107 
Verheugen, Gunter. “The European Neighborhood Policy.” Address before the Prime 
Ministerial Conference of the Vilnius and Visegrad Democracies, Bratislava (March 
19, 2004). 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/141&format=
HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [accessed December 12, 2006]. 
 
Wallace, Helen. “Enlarging the European Union: Reflections on the Challenge of 
Analysis.” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no. 4 (August 2002): 658-665. 
 
Wallander, Celeste A. “International Institutions in a Globalizing World: Implications for 
Transatlantic Security.” In Globalization and Transatlantic Security, edited by Rachel 
A. Epstein and Pascal Vennesson. Fiesole (Italy): European University Institute, 
2006.   
 
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics.” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992). 
 
Youngs, Richard, ed. Global Europe. Report 02: New Terms of Engagement. London: 
Foreign Policy Center, 2005. 
 
Yost, David S. NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998. 
108 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
109 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Rafael Biermann 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Donald Abenheim 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
5. Ministry of Defense 
Chisinau, Republic of Moldova 
 
6. Institute for Public Policies 
Chisinau, Republic of Moldova 
 
 
